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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Prompted by the revival of interest in industrial policy in several European countries, this 
paper considers what lessons can be learned from earlier European experience. The focus 
is mainly on sectoral or targeted industrial policy, designed to improve the performance of 
particular industries.    
Since the Second World War European industrial policy has passed through two phases. The 
first, starting in the 1960s, saw a series of attempts by governments, especially those of the 
UK and France, to create national champions in industries deemed essential to the health 
of the national economy. Among the favoured sectors were high-technology industries such 
as aerospace and computers; part of the motivation was to narrow the “technology gap” 
between Europe and the US. There was also a widely held belief in scale as the key to inter-
national competitiveness. 
With some exceptions these interventions were generally unsuccessful. Policy-makers tend-
ed to overrate the risks and costs of market failures and to underestimate those associated 
with government failures. There was also a mistaken assumption that there were certain 
technologies which a country somehow needed to have, and that they were more likely to be 
acquired through centralised direction than through competitive markets. The cost to the 
taxpayer of ill-judged industrial policy was high.         
From the 1980s, with the UK setting the pace, there was a shift towards horizontal, non-
selective policies aimed at improving the environment for all firms. Both at the national and 
at the European level (through the Single Market Programme), more emphasis was placed 
on competition. The ability of governments to support their industries was curtailed, and 
previously protected sectors such as telecommunications and electricity were partially lib-
eralised. At the same time new institutions were established – the Framework Programme 
and Eureka – to promote intra-European cooperation in research. 
The surge in US productivity growth from the mid-1990s, linked to the rapid application of 
information technology, led European governments to rethink their approach to industrial 
policy. The new priority was to encourage the growth of entrepreneurial high-technology 
firms on the American model, to develop the venture capital industry and to make stock 
markets more accessible to younger companies. 
By the early 2000s some progress had been made, but there was still a wide productivity 
gap with the US, and in several high-technology sectors, such as information technology 
and biotechnology, European firms were lagging behind their American counterparts. (The 
aerospace industry, through Airbus, was a notable exception.) There was also a growing 
concern about de-industrialisation, attributed in part to the shift of manufacturing to China 
and other emerging economies.  
The financial crisis of 2008-09 heightened these anxieties, causing governments not only 
to provide short-term help to ailing industries such as the car manufacturers but also to 
consider whether a more active industrial policy might be needed in the longer term. Some 
economists argued for a revival of sector-based policies in a form that would avoid the mis-
takes of the past.
The events described in this paper cast serious doubt on the notion that governments can 
create competitive advantage through direct intervention, and on their ability to select win-
ning technologies or industries. The main conclusion of the paper is that industrial policy 
3ECIPE OCCASIONAL PAPER
No. 1/2012
should be horizontal rather than sectoral, and embedded in a set of policies and institutions 
which promote competition, encourage innovation and facilitate industrial change.   
1. INTRODUCTION
Industrial policy in Western Europe has gone through two phases since the end of the 
Second World War and may now be in the early stages of a third. In the first phase, govern-
ments sought to improve the performance of their national industries and companies through 
targeted intervention, using a variety of tools that included subsidies for research and devel-
opment, preferential procurement by public agencies, and the promotion of mergers. 
The second phase, which began in the 1980s and continued into the 1990s and early 2000s, 
saw a shift towards horizontal or non-selective policies aimed at improving the business cli-
mate for all firms, and a greater reliance on competition. This period was marked by a deep-
ening of economic integration within the European Union. Barriers to cross-border trade 
and investment were reduced; state-controlled sectors such as electricity and telecommu-
nications were partially liberalised; and curbs were imposed on the ability of governments 
to protect or support their indigenous companies. 
The events of the last few years suggest that the trend towards non-intervention may have 
come to a halt. The financial crisis of 2008-09 and the severe recession that followed prompt-
ed governments to give financial support, not just to banks, but also to other industries, 
principally the car manufacturers, which had been hard hit by falling demand. These inter-
ventions were in response to exceptional events, but seemed to indicate a greater willingness 
on the part of governments to support industries or companies that were deemed to be too 
important to fail. There has also been a growing anxiety, apparent before the financial crisis, 
about the ability of European industry to adapt to the changing international division of la-
bour and, in particular, to the shift of manufacturing to China and other emerging economies. 
This has encouraged the view that the active involvement of governments is necessary if 
European industry is to strengthen its position in knowledge-intensive sectors that are less 
vulnerable to competition from low-wage countries.  
Arguments for some form of industrial policy are also being made in the US, by economists as 
well as business leaders. One of the anxieties there is whether the offshoring of production 
(and some design tasks) to low-wage countries in electronics and other industries may have 
contributed to persistently high unemployment, as well as weakened the country’s innova-
tive capacity.  What the government can do to slow down this process is not clear, but there 
are some influential voices advocating targeted support for technologies that are likely to 
boost the manufacturing sector and to generate high-wage jobs.
How to define the government’s role, and what the balance should be between horizontal 
and sectoral policies, is the subject of active debate on both sides of the Atlantic. The purpose 
of this paper is to contribute to the debate by reviewing the evolution of industrial policy in 
Europe since the Second World War. The paper discusses industrial policy both at national 
level, focusing mainly on the UK, Germany and France, and at European level. The aim is to 
identify successes as well as failures, drawing on American and Japanese as well as European 
experience, and to draw some conclusions about what policies are likely to be effective in 
the current circumstances.
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1.1. DEFINITIONS
Industrial policy can be defined in several different ways. In this paper the term is used 
to refer to measures taken by governments to bring about industrial outcomes different from 
those that would result if markets were allowed free rein. These measures may be horizontal 
in character, affecting all firms, or specific to particular sectors or companies. 
The latter may include: the promotion of “infant” or fledgling industries in the hope that, 
through government assistance, they will become profitable and internationally competitive; 
support for the restructuring and modernisation of industries that are regarded as important 
because of their role as employers or exporters, or because of their links to national defence, 
or because they produce technology that will be used in other parts of the economy; the 
creation of national champions through government-induced mergers; and the rescue of 
failing firms.     
Industrial policy is closely linked to technology policy. The latter refers to the policies and 
institutions through which governments seek to encourage the development and exploita-
tion of advanced technologies.1 Here, too, the policy instruments may be horizontal – for 
example, tax incentives for research and development – or directed at particular industries 
such as biotechnology or information technology. 
This paper treats industrial policy and technology policy together, since both are directed at 
the same objective, improving industrial performance, and both have been extensively used 
in Europe since the Second World War.2   
The theoretical case for industrial policy is that it is necessary to offset market failures. Most 
economists accept that government support for basic scientific research, conducted princi-
pally in universities and public laboratories, is justified because the market – competition 
among private-sector firms – cannot be relied upon to generate investment in research at the 
socially desirable level. Successful inventors are not able to secure all of the benefits of their 
discoveries, even with an effective patent system; they share these benefits with customers, 
and with imitators. Thus the social benefits from basic research can exceed the returns that 
a private-sector firm can obtain from investing in this activity.3 A central question in the 
industrial policy debate is how far the market failure argument justifies intervention “down-
stream”, to support the production of goods or services which would normally be supplied 
through the market – for example, to create or enlarge industries which are potentially valu-
able to the economy but in which private companies are reluctant to invest.
Other policies which affect industrial performance, and which to some extent overlap with 
industrial policy, are competition policy, trade policy and education and training policy. Gov-
ernments can choose, within the limits imposed by international trading rules, how much 
weight to give to competition, both internal competition and competition from imports, as a 
spur to industrial efficiency, and how big a role foreign companies should play in their econo-
mies. In education and training, countries differ in the way the supply of skills is organised, 
and in the extent to which universities serve the needs of industry. National policy in all 
these areas can have at least as big an impact on the structure and performance of industry 
as industrial policy.              
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2. THE FIRST PHASE: FROM THE 1950S TO THE 1980S
The immediate task facing European governments after 1945 was to repair the damage 
caused by the war and to re-establish a well-functioning peacetime economy. The longer-
term challenge was to exploit the technical and organisational innovations that had been 
made by American companies before and during the war, and to raise productivity closer 
to US levels. In steel, for example, an early priority was to install continuous hot strip mills, 
which had been widely adopted in the US for making high-quality sheet steel for the car 
manufacturers. Whether or not they were directly owned by the state, most European steel 
companies were given financial assistance, some of it coming from Marshall Plan funds, to 
finance the modernisation of their factories.4  
Other industries which were seen as basic to the health of the economy, such as coal, electric-
ity and railways, also received government support in the early post-war years. Some of them 
were taken over by the state, and remained in the public sector until the privatisations of the 
1980s and 1990s. However, nationalisation was not linked to industrial policy in the sense in 
which that term came to be used in later years.   
The impetus for greater government activism in the 1960s stemmed in part from disquiet 
over the “technology gap” between Europe and the US.5 European firms were losing ground 
to their American rivals in high-technology industries such as aerospace and electronics, and 
government support was thought to be necessary if the lag was to be corrected. At the same 
time some of Europe’s older industries such as textiles and shipbuilding were hard hit by 
competition from low-wage countries; some governments sought to slow down the decline 
through state-financed rationalisation schemes. This defensive aspect of industrial policy 
– the attempt to rehabilitate distressed industries - became more prominent in the difficult 
economic conditions that followed the increase in oil prices in 1973/74. Several industries, 
including steel and some branches of the chemical industry, were struggling with severe 
excess capacity.6 A painful adjustment was necessary, prompting intervention both from 
national governments and, towards the end of the decade, from the European Commission. 
Of the three largest European countries, the UK and France were the most active practition-
ers of industrial policy in the first thirty years after the war. In the UK, much of the interven-
tion took place under Labour administrations, although the Conservatives were by no means 
as non-interventionist as their rhetoric suggested. In France there was no alternative in the 
conditions which prevailed at the end of the war but for the government to supervise and fi-
nance the reconstruction of the economy, as it had done after the First World War.7 There was 
a long tradition in France of state support for industry, going back to Jean-Baptiste Colbert 
in the seventeenth century and a “Colbertist” approach was followed by post-war French 
governments, especially in the 1960s and 1970s.  Another factor in the UK and France was 
that both countries were in the throes of losing overseas empires; part of the motivation for 
active industrial policy was the desire to preserve their status as world powers.8  
West Germany was in a different situation after the war, and adopted different policies. In a 
fundamental break with the autarkic, state-controlled policies of the Nazi era, the Christian 
Democrat party that won power in the first federal elections in 1949 was committed to the 
principles of Ordo-liberalism – a belief in free markets, a vigorous competition policy and a 
limited role for government. Although there were some deviations from this stance, espe-
cially in the 1970s when the Social Democratic party entered government, state intervention 
in industry was much less than in the UK or France in the first thirty years after the war. 
Moreover, because of the restrictions imposed by the Allies after the war, West Germany was 
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barred from involvement in defence-related industries such as aerospace and computers 
until the mid-1950s. Even after that date these industries never had as high a political profile 
in Germany as they did in the UK and France. 
2.1. THE UK
The first Labour government which held office from 1945 to 1951 set in train a massive 
expansion of state control of the economy through nationalisation. New state corporations 
were created in electricity, gas, coal, railways and (near the end of the government’s term) 
steel.9 Telecommunications, which was part of the Post Office, was already in the public sec-
tor, as was the principal airline, British Overseas Airways Corporation.10  Outside these “com-
manding heights” of the economy, Labour had no long-term plan for industry as a whole (the 
main focus was on increasing production in the short term, especially in exporting indus-
tries11), but it took a close interest in two high-technology sectors – aircraft and computers 
–  which were to become major recipients of state support under subsequent governments. 
The aircraft industry had been greatly expanded during the war, and the government had 
to find a way of scaling it back while at the same time preserving what was seen as one 
of Britain’s great industrial assets. Several factories were closed, but a substantial military 
programme was maintained, and the government provided funds for the development of a 
wide range of civil aircraft.12 These included the De Havilland Comet, which when it entered 
service in 1951 was the world’s first jet airliner. However, any hope that the Comet would be 
a commercial success was dashed when a design flaw caused two fatal crashes. The aircraft 
had been rushed into production too quickly, and De Havilland soon lost ground to the big 
American companies, led by Boeing and Douglas. While avoidable mistakes were made on 
the British side, the American industry had two advantages which were lacking in the UK; a 
large domestic market and the presence of several competing private-sector airlines which 
put pressure on the manufacturers to design efficient and economical aircraft. 
British companies, whether making civil or military aircraft, had shorter production runs 
than their American counterparts, and hence higher costs. This problem was partially ad-
dressed through an enforced rationalisation of the industry which took place at the insist-
ence of the Conservative government in 1959, creating two large airframe groups, British 
Aircraft Corporation ( jointly owned by Vickers and English Electric) and Hawker Siddeley 
(which included De Havilland). At the same time, in order to support the industry’s efforts on 
the civil side, the government introduced a system of launch aid; companies that undertook 
new civil aircraft and aero-engine projects were eligible for grants, with repayment linked 
to sales.  
During the second half of the 1950s, scientists in the industry and in government research 
laboratories began to examine the feasibility of a supersonic jet airliner. If such an aircraft 
could be built, the British manufacturers might be able to regain the lead that they had lost 
to their US rivals in subsonic jets. By 1959 detailed design studies were under way and the 
supersonic project had gained some political momentum, but the cost was too high for the 
UK to undertake alone. The French aircraft industry, which was also struggling to keep up 
with the Americans, was a logical partner, and in 1962 the two governments agreed to share 
the development costs of what became the Concorde airliner. It was a decision that was to 
prove enormously costly for the British taxpayer, as well as diverting resources from other 
parts of the market where British manufacturers had better prospects of earning a commer-
cial return.13  
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In computers the starting point in 1945 looked promising, since British technology was about 
on a par with that of the US. But American computer manufacturers gained an advantage 
in the formative years of the industry through development contracts from the Department 
of Defense. Government-funded technology gave IBM and others useful experience as they 
planned their entry into commercial data processing.14 The defence market in the US was 
far bigger than in the UK, and despite support from the National Research Development 
Corporation (an agency set up in 1949 to promote the commercialisation of publicly funded 
research), the R & D effort in the UK bore no comparison with what was going on in the US.15 
Moreover, like the aircraft industry, the British computer industry was fragmented, and it 
was not until 1958 that two of the larger companies got together (without government direc-
tion or support) to form International Computers and Tabulators (ICT). By pooling forces 
in research and development the two companies hoped to compete more effectively against 
IBM, which was emerging as the dominant player in the world market.16 
 In another high-technology sector – nuclear power – the UK’s position seemed strong in the 
early post-war years, and here too, there was a strong desire to maintain an independent Brit-
ish capability. Using technology derived from work on the atomic bomb, the Atomic Energy 
Authority (AEA) developed a nuclear reactor that used gas as the coolant and graphite as 
the moderator.17 Its Calder Hall reactor, which went on stream in 1956, was the first nuclear 
reactor in the world to be connected to a power grid. The AEA’s gas-graphite technology, 
known as Magnox, was the basis for the UK’s first nuclear power stations. By 1960 nine 
Magnox stations were in operation or under construction and the UK had the largest nuclear 
power programme in the world. Although the principal motive was to reduce the electricity 
industry’s dependence on coal and oil, there were hopes that the companies involved would 
generate a sizeable export business.  
Large sums of public money were spent in these three sectors, but neither the first Labour 
government nor its Conservative successor, which held office from 1951 to 1964, can be said 
to have had a policy for high-technology industries. Their main preoccupation was with 
trying to reconcile their macro-economic objectives – full employment, low inflation and 
balance of payments equilibrium. It was only in the closing years of Conservative rule that 
attention switched to the supply side of the economy. The UK was growing more slowly 
than West Germany and France, and British industry was losing ground in export markets. 
Because the government had stood aside from the first moves towards European economic 
integration, British industry had not benefited from the expansion of intra-European trade 
that had begun in the 1950s and accelerated in the 1960s. (The first application to join the 
Common Market, made by Harold Macmillan in 1961, was vetoed by General Charles de 
Gaulle.) But the bigger problem was seen to lie in poor management, antiquated production 
methods and dysfunctional industrial relations. 
Out of this reappraisal came the creation of the National Economic Development Office in 
1962, followed by industry-level Economic Development Committees. These new agencies 
were modelled on the French planning system, which included sector-based Modernisation 
Commissions, bringing together businessmen, trade unionists, outside experts and civil serv-
ants to discuss the future of key industries.18 The practical achievements of “Neddy” and the 
“little Neddies” were meagre, but they represented a step towards supply-side reform which 
was taken much further by the Labour governments that held office between 1964 and 1970. 
These years saw “a dramatic increase in the pace of microeconomic intervention, and also 
in the trend towards selectivity in industrial policy”.19 
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Two new Whitehall departments were created, the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) 
and the Ministry of Technology (Mintech). Much of the DEA’s energies were devoted to 
the National Plan, which the government hoped would provide the basis for faster growth. 
However, the Plan was unrealistic in its projections and was thrown off course by Britain’s 
continuing balance of payments problems. Potentially more promising were Mintech’s ef-
forts to accelerate the process of technical change in industry. The aim was to redirect the 
government’s spending on research and development from defence to civilian uses, to cut 
back on prestige projects which had no prospect of generating a commercial return, and to 
identify key sectors where faster technological progress was needed.20   
Computers was one of the targeted industries, and soon after the election the government 
had to deal with a financial crisis in ICT, the UK’s leading computer company. This was 
due, not so much to competition from IBM (although the American company had increased 
its share of the British market to about 40 per cent), as to the mismanaged launch of a new 
family of computers and the unexpectedly rapid decline in sales of its older punched-card 
equipment.21 Mintech officials believed that ICT was too small and pressed for a merger 
with the second largest supplier, the computer division of English Electric.22  This was finally 
achieved in 1968 with the creation of International Computers Limited (ICL), in which the 
government took a 10.5 per cent stake. It also provided a £13.5m grant for the development of 
a new range of computers, and instructed government departments to buy their computers 
from ICL unless there were strong technical reasons for not doing so.23      
Labour ministers were less inclined to support the aircraft industry which they believed had 
absorbed too much of the country’s engineering and scientific resources. Several military 
projects were cancelled, including an advanced fighter, the TSR2, which was scrapped in 
favour of an American aircraft. The government also considered pulling out of Concorde, but 
France was determined to continue with the project, and the terms of the 1962 agreement 
made the costs of unilateral withdrawal appear unacceptably high.24  In 1967 the government 
agreed to cooperate with France in developing a new subsonic airliner, the Airbus, but with-
drew two years later on the grounds that the new aircraft was unlikely to be economic and 
its specification made it unsuitable for British European Airways. One of the few bright spots 
in the aircraft industry was Rolls-Royce, the aero-engine manufacturer. This company had 
been an early leader in jet engines for military aircraft, and it built on this experience, with 
support from the government, to launch a successful attack on civil markets. 25
In nuclear power the first-generation Magnox stations were nearing the end of their life, and 
for the next generation a choice had to be made between the Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor 
(AGR), which had been developed by the Atomic Energy Authority and, like Magnox, was 
based on gas-graphite technology, and the American light water reactor which had gained 
wide acceptance around the world. The AGR was chosen, apparently on the grounds that 
the technology was safer and had greater long-term potential. 26  This decision, announced 
in 1965, was regarded on all sides as a triumph for British technology, but it turned out to be 
a serious mistake. The Atomic Energy Authority had under-estimated the problems involved 
in scaling up the pilot reactor, and the AGR programme was plagued by technical problems 
and cost over-runs.
Alongside its support for (preferably home-grown) advanced technology Labour’s industrial 
policy was influenced by its belief in scale. Ministers and their advisers considered that many 
British industries were too fragmented and that the necessary rationalisation was unlikely 
to take place without government intervention. The Industrial Reorganisation Corporation 
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(IRC) was set up for this purpose, and it helped to restructure several industries.27  In elec-
trical engineering, for example, the three largest companies were brought together under 
the leadership of the General Electric Company (GEC) to create a British group capable of 
competing against international companies such as Siemens in Germany and General Elec-
tric in the US. Although no government finance was provided in this case, GEC became in 
effect the UK’s national champion in the electrical industry; it had also had a strong position 
in telecommunications equipment and in several branches of electronics. 
An even more complex merger brought virtually all the British-owned car and truck manu-
facturers into the hands of a single organisation, British Leyland Motor Corporation. Part of 
the motivation for this deal was to prevent further inroads by American companies into the 
British market; Ford and General Motors were already well established in the UK, and one 
of the smaller companies, Rootes, had recently been acquired by Chrysler. The hope was that 
the new group would match the economies of scale enjoyed by the leading American and 
European companies.  
The need for scale was also the justification used by Labour for the decision to re-nationalise 
the steel industry in 1967, although in this case politics played as big a part as economics. 
Having been nationalised in 1951 and privatised by the Conservatives two years later, steel 
had become a shuttlecock in the ideological contest between the two main parties. Labour 
argued that the newly created British Steel Corporation would bring about the structural 
changes that the private sector had been unwilling to undertake.  
As later events were to show, the government vastly underestimated the difficulties of mak-
ing these large mergers work. More generally, its industrial policies did little to improve the 
UK’s economic performance. When Labour lost the 1970 election to the Conservatives, the 
stage seemed set for a shift away from state intervention. One of the first acts of the new 
government, led by Edward Heath, was to close down the Industrial Reorganisation Corpo-
ration. The Ministry of Technology was also disbanded, with most of its functions going to 
the Department of Trade and Industry. In practice, however, four years of Conservative rule 
brought little change in the conduct of industrial policy. A series of industrial crises forced 
the government to retreat from its non-interventionist stance.  
The first was the near-collapse of Rolls-Royce. The company had developed an innovative 
engine, the RB211, and had persuaded Lockheed of the US to install it in a new airliner. 
However, development costs proved far greater than had been anticipated, and by 1970, de-
spite launch aid from the government, the company was close to bankruptcy. Because of the 
importance of the company as defence contractor and exporter the government felt obliged 
to intervene. As Edward Heath wrote later, “we were conscious that the engine (the RB211) 
was a potential market leader in just the kind of high-technology field which we were keen 
to encourage”.28 In 1971, after receivers had been called in, the government took over the 
aero-engine side of the company; the Rolls-Royce cars business was detached and floated 
on the stock market. 
Problems in shipbuilding and other ailing sectors prompted further assistance from the state, 
and in 1972 the government passed an Industry Act which “gave more or less carte blanche 
for crisis-driven intervention, although it lacked much in the way of a strategic orienta-
tion”.29  One of the companies that received assistance under the Act was ICL, in the form 
of launch aid for a new range of computers. Despite their rhetorical belief in market forces, 
the Conservatives were as anxious as their Labour predecessors to preserve a strong British 
player in this industry. Some consideration was given to merging ICL with a European or 
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American company, but the government was insistent that control of ICL should remain in 
the UK. It was also impressed by the fact that the French and German governments were 
supporting their computer industries on a more lavish scale than in Britain. 30      
When Labour returned to office in 1974, its enthusiasm for industrial policy was undimin-
ished; it sought “a closer, clearer and more positive relationship between government and 
industry”.31  The promotion of mergers was no longer seen as a high priority, but the successor 
to the IRC, the National Enterprise Board (NEB), was given wide powers to invest in com-
panies, to provide funds for new product development and to create new ventures in sectors 
that were thought to be of strategic importance. However, Labour’s hope that the new agency 
would play a central role in modernising British industry was dashed by the recession which 
followed the quadrupling of world oil prices at the end of 1973. As the recession deepened, 
the NEB came to act mainly as a hospital for wounded companies. 32  
The biggest of the “lame ducks” was British Leyland, which was badly hit by the fall in car 
sales and had to turn to the government for financial support. After the government had 
agreed to stand behind the company’s debts, Lord Ryder, head of the NEB, was asked to work 
out a plan for restoring British Leyland to health. Ryder’s proposals, which were accepted 
by the government, called for an injection of over £1bn into the company over an eight-year 
period, with most of the money coming from the taxpayer.33  The Ryder plan was based on 
the assumption, unsupported by evidence or analysis, that a revived British Leyland would 
be able to compete profitably in all segments of the car and truck market. 
Several other troubled companies came into the NEB’s fold, including Alfred Herbert, the 
country’s largest machine tool maker, and Ferranti, a leading electronics firm. The NEB also 
inherited the government’s shareholding in ICL, which was increased to 25 per cent through 
the purchase of shares from the two private-sector shareholders, GEC and Plessey. The com-
pany performed better during this period, and, although it continued to benefit from prefer-
ential procurement and from R & D grants, there seemed a reasonable prospect that it might 
be able to wean itself off government support. The share price in 1979 rose to its highest level 
since the company’s creation in 1968. 
 The NEB took responsibility for the state-owned Rolls-Royce, which had recovered from 
the Lockheed crisis and, with the help of continuing launch aid from the government, was 
developing derivatives of the RB-211. Although the technical risks with this engine had been 
underestimated, the basic design was sound, and Rolls-Royce was beginning to gain ground 
against its two main US rivals, Pratt & Whitney and General Electric. 34  
On the airframe side of the industry, little progress had been made in civil airliners since 
withdrawal from the Airbus, and the case for further public investment was weakened by 
the fact that very few of the projects supported by launch aid since the policy had been 
introduced had earned a commercial return. 35 For reasons that had more to with politics 
than economics the government nationalised the industry in 1977 – Labour claimed that the 
manufacturers’ dependence on public funds made private ownership anomalous – but that 
did nothing to improve its performance or to clarify its strategic direction. 
Shortly before the 1979 election the government had to decide whether the newly national-
ised British Aerospace should take up an offer from Boeing to share in the development of the 
new 757 airliner, or rejoin the Airbus. The government initially favoured the Boeing proposal 
on the grounds that a US link would strengthen British Aerospace and make it less depend-
ent on public funds. Although orders for the first Airbus, the A300, were picking up after a 
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slow start (it had made a crucial breakthrough in the US in 1978 when it won an order from 
Eastern Airlines), Ministers were doubtful whether the project would ever show an adequate 
return. However, they were under pressure from other European governments to show their 
commitment to European collaboration, and from British Aerospace, which feared that if 
it accepted the Boeing proposal it would be reduced to the status of a sub-contractor. The 
government rejoined the Airbus consortium as a full partner, and provided £100m in launch 
aid for British Aerospace’s contribution to the next member of the Airbus family, the A310.
The UK’s policy towards civil airliners had been erratic, and the same was true of nuclear 
power. By 1970 it was clear that the decision to go for the British-designed AGR had been a 
mistake, and the principal operator, the Central Electricity Generating Board, was pressing 
for a switch to the American light water reactor. This marked the start of a lengthy debate 
about reactor choice, the outcome of which, in 1978, has been described as “a truly Brit-
ish compromise”. Two more AGRs would be ordered and at the same time the government 
would examine the option of introducing the light water reactor in the early 1980s.36 The 
effect of the AGR debacle and the long period of uncertainty was to destroy any hope that 
nuclear power might be the basis of a successful British export industry. 
The threat of US domination was a powerful influence on government policy towards high-
technology industries during this period, but Ministers were wrong to suppose that Amer-
ica’s competitive strength derived mainly from very large companies such as IBM. Much of 
the dynamism of American industry, especially in high-technology sectors, came from new 
entrants – entrepreneurial firms that were often better able than old-established companies 
to understand and exploit new technological opportunities. A classic example was Intel, 
founded in 1968, which within a decade became the world’s leading producer of semiconduc-
tor memories. Another was Genentech, one of the first and most successful biotechnology 
companies. To its credit, the NEB recognised that, if the UK was to make headway in this 
type of industry, the initiative would have to come from new entrants. 
Two such ventures which at first seemed to have a chance of success were Celltech in bio-
technology and Inmos in semiconductors; they were set up as independent companies, large-
ly funded by the NEB but with private sector participation. 37  The reluctance of established 
British companies to invest in these two industries was seen by the NEB as a market failure 
which could only be tackled by government intervention. The NEB was willing “to take risks 
and to back a radically different course from the received wisdom of the industry”. 38  
The NEB might have gone further in this direction had it not been for Labour’s defeat in the 
1979 election. The new Conservative government, led by Margaret Thatcher, reluctantly 
agreed that Celltech could go ahead, as long as a majority of the shares were held by private 
investors. As for Inmos, the NEB was instructed to find a private sector buyer; it was sold first 
to Thorn-EMI, a British electronics group, and later re-sold to SGS-Thomson, the Franco-
Italian semiconductor company. As Mrs Thatcher saw it, the National Enterprise Board was 
based on the false premise that government officials could identify and nurture promising 
technologies and companies; she was determined to dismantle it as quickly as possible.
Even allowing for the exceptionally difficult economic situation which prevailed in the sec-
ond half of the 1970s, Labour’s industrial policy had done little to strengthen British indus-
try. It had created national champions on the basis of unrealistic assumptions of what these 
companies were likely to achieve. It had exaggerated the importance of scale as a source of 
competitive advantage.39 It had failed to inject new dynamism into technically backward 
industries. 40 Where whole industries had been taken into public ownership the effect had 
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been to politicise decision-making and to delay adjustment to market changes.41 Unlimited 
access to public funds, as in the British Leyland case, had the effect of insulating managers 
and employees from the realities of the market.   
    
2.2. FRANCE
Among European countries France is the one which has most consistently used the power 
of the state to support selected industries and companies, especially those linked to national 
defence and infrastructure. This was especially true in the first thirty years after the war. 
After the mid-1980s the extent of state intervention was greatly reduced as France adopted 
more liberal policies. Even today, however, the concept of the state as the protector of the 
nation’s industrial assets has not gone away. 
In 1945 French industry, after two decades of under-investment, urgently needed moderni-
sation, and the private sector was in no state to finance it. To remedy these weaknesses the 
first post-war governments used two principal instruments: nationalisation, bringing most of 
the basic industries, including coal, electricity and gas, into public ownership; and a system 
of indicative planning through which the government targeted high-priority sectors and 
ensured that funds were made available, mostly through state-owned banks, to support new 
investment. The only large manufacturing company to be taken over was Renault. This was 
not done for industrial or economic reasons, but in retaliation for the owner’s alleged col-
laboration with the Nazis during the war; the managers of Renault, though appointed by the 
state, were allowed to run the business with a high degree of autonomy. 42  
There were also moves to strengthen the country’s capabilities in scientific research. The 
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), which had been set up just before the 
war, was reorganised and given a mandate to develop and coordinate all French science. New 
technical agencies were created to undertake research in telecommunications, aeronautics 
and energy. Research into nuclear power, and later nuclear weapons, was entrusted to the 
Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique (CEA). These institutions helped to offset the weakness 
of research in universities and the absence in France of the large, company-owned laborato-
ries which existed in Germany and the US. 43      
By the early 1950s, despite political instability and chronic inflation (leading to several de-
valuations of the franc), the economy was growing at a satisfactory rate. Outside the public 
sector, however, there was little change in the structure of industry, much of which consisted 
of small, family-owned firms. Such firms could prosper as long as they were protected by 
high tariffs, but that situation came to an end with France’s decision to join with Germany 
in creating the Common Market in 1957. As tariff barriers came down French industry was 
forced to adapt to a more demanding market, made all the more competitive by the presence 
of American companies that were stepping up their operations in Europe. The 1960s saw a 
wave of mergers and acquisitions, some of them promoted by government. The objective was 
to achieve economies of scale, but concentration also made it easier for the planners in Paris 
to establish a close rapport with the leading companies in each industry. “To a degree present 
in few other nations, the management of French industrial strategy became a cooperative 
endeavour between civil servants and industrialists”. 44   
This was the era of national champions and grands projets, driven by General de Gaulle’s 
determination, after he had returned to the presidency in 1958, to lift France into the front 
rank of industrial nations. As one commentator has written, De Gaulle’s mission, brooded 
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over for twelve years, was to save France. “This meant military independence, without which 
no state was truly sovereign; economic independence, without which no state was master 
of its own house; and technological revolution, without which no state could maintain the 
first two conditions”. 45 
On the military side, work on developing an atomic bomb had begun in 1954, and the pro-
gramme was accelerated after de Gaulle’s return to power. The early years of his presidency 
saw heavy investment in military aircraft and missiles, creating an American-style military-
industrial complex which included private sector firms such as Dassault, the principal manu-
facturer of military aircraft, and Matra, a specialist in defence electronics, as well as several 
nationalised concerns. Government support took the form of public procurement, subsidised 
research, subsidised exports and industrial diplomacy, together with long-term research and 
production contracts from the Ministry of Defence. 46 
The French government was no less determined to build up the civil side of the aircraft in-
dustry. The state-owned Sud Aviation (later part of Aérospatiale), which had enjoyed some 
success with the Caravelle jet airliner in the 1950s, was the French partner in the Concorde 
project. It was also the prime mover, along with Snecma, the state-owned aero-engine manu-
facturer, in the establishment of the Airbus consortium. Although the Airbus project was 
to go through many difficulties before it established itself as a credible rival to Boeing, the 
French government never wavered in its support for civil airliner development. Here, as in 
other areas, there was a consistency in French industrial policy which was lacking in the UK.
Some of the same companies were involved in the development of space technology, which 
began in 1961 with the creation of a government research institute, the Centre National 
d’Études Spatiales (CNES). CNES built a launching base in French Guyana and undertook 
projects for civilian and military uses in cooperation with Aérospatiale and Matra. Work on 
the Ariane launcher began shortly after de Gaulle had left the presidency, and although this 
became part of a collaborative European space programme most of the funding came from 
France.47 Mastery of space technology was another illustration of de Gaulle’s determination 
not to be dependent on the US. 
Unlike the UK, France had not been in the forefront of computer technology in the 1950s and 
the authorities had been slow to recognise the importance of the industry. Two events in 1964 
prompted a change of policy. 48  The first was the acquisition of Bull, the largest French com-
puter company, by General Electric of the US; the government sought to frustrate the deal by 
encouraging two French companies to take over Bull, but they declined to do so. The second 
was the launch by IBM of the System 360 family of computers, a move which threatened to 
reinforce its already dominant world market position. In the following year the case for an 
independent French capability was underlined by the US government’s decision to block the 
sale of two Control Data computers to the French Atomic Energy Commission. 
The response was the Plan Calcul, an attempt to foster a French-owned computer company 
capable of withstanding American competition. 49  Three firms were merged to form Com-
pagnie Internationale pour l’Informatique (CII), which would be supported by subsidies and 
by preferential procurement on the part of government agencies. These firms were subsidiar-
ies of electrical groups - Compagnie Générale d’Électricité (CGE), CSF and Schneider - all of 
which became shareholders in the new company. The government also took steps to ensure 
that CII had access to an indigenous source of electronic components. Subsidies were made 
available under the Plan Composants to a semiconductor producer, Cosem, which was then 
part of CSF. Control of CSF was later acquired by Thomson, and the enlarged semiconductor 
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business, Sescosem, became the national champion in what was seen as a vitally important 
sector of the electronics industry.50  
The principle behind the Plan Calcul, as of other grands projets initiated during de Gaulle’s 
presidency, was what Élie Cohen has described as offensive protectionism. “The sovereign 
state creates the means of accumulation of scientific and financial resources. It provides fu-
ture national champions with grants, secure markets through public procurement policies, 
and prevents foreign entry.” 51  The effect was to create close ties between the government and 
a group of favoured companies which depended on the state for a large part of their business. 
One of the beneficiaries was CGE, which through a series of mergers and acquisitions lifted 
itself into the front rank of French industry; the number of its employees rose from 33,000 
in 1960 to more than 100,000 in 1971. A key event was the so-called Yalta agreement in 1969 
with Thomson, through which CGE acquired control of Alsthom, the principal supplier of 
power engineering equipment, while ceding to Thomson its interests in defence electron-
ics and domestic appliances. Thomson also agreed not to compete in telecommunications 
equipment, leaving CGE to dominate this sector through its Alcatel subsidiary. Shortly before 
the CGE agreement, Thomson had acquired control of CSF, which had been an early leader in 
radio and TV broadcasting and had later established a leading position in military electron-
ics. CSF was an important supplier to the Ministry of Defence, and the acquisition brought 
Thomson more closely into the world of grands projets. 52 
Typically run by énarques 53 who had the same educational background as the government 
officials with whom they dealt, CGE and Thomson formed part of the oligopolistic core of 
French industry. By the end of the 1960s, as a result of mergers and acquisitions, most major 
industries had become more concentrated, with two or three companies emerging as clear 
leaders. Some of France’s largest firms, such as Michelin and Peugeot, were family-control-
led and had few direct links with the state. Others depended on the patronage of government, 
as participants in grands projets or as suppliers to public sector agencies. 
De Gaulle’s approach to industrial policy was broadly maintained under his successor, 
Georges Pompidou, who held office from 1969 until his death in 1974, but Pompidou was 
more pragmatic than his predecessor and less obsessed with French independence vis-à-vis 
the US. An early decision was to accept the recommendation from the French electricity 
authority, Électricité de France (EDF), to base France’s nuclear power programme on the 
light water reactor designed by Westinghouse in the US. This was opposed by the CEA which 
wanted to stick with France’s indigenous gas-graphite technology, but EDF and its suppliers 
feared that if France became technologically isolated from the rest of the world the potential 
export market would rapidly disappear.54   
The investment in nuclear power, begun under Pompidou and accelerated after the first oil 
shock in 1973/74, was an example of a state-led project based on cooperation between two 
government-owned agencies, CEA and EDF, and two contractors, Framatome (then jointly 
owned by Schneider and the CEA), and the CGE subsidiary Alsthom.  Another French project 
which started during Pompidou’s presidency was the Train à Grande Vitesse (TGV); here, 
too, a CGE subsidiary, Alsthom was the main private sector contractor to SNCF, the state-
owned railway company. The TGV, which became a symbol of France’s technical and engi-
neering prowess, was typical of the French approach to large-scale infrastructure projects, 
“driven through by small but highly influential and well-trained technological elite, mostly 
top graduates of a single institution whose members move smoothly between the political, 
administrative and corporate worlds”.55 
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With both nuclear power and the TGV the customer was the government or a government 
agency, and it was in industries of this kind where French industrial policy was most effec-
tive. In industries where the end-users were dispersed and less influenced by the state, the 
French approach worked less well. Nowhere was this clearer than in computers. By 1971 the 
ambitions set for CII, the computer company, were a long way from being achieved. It still 
had a very small share of the French market, which was dominated by IBM, and it was barely 
represented in other European countries. 
To renew its product range, further government support was necessary, and this was pro-
vided under the second Plan Calcul, launched in 1971. At this point a possible European so-
lution emerged. Siemens in Germany had entered the industry with its own computers, but 
by the early 1960s these machines were becoming obsolete; its share of the German market 
was not much more than 5 per cent. In 1964 it signed a licensing and supply agreement with 
RCA in the US, and began selling RCA’s Spectra line of computers under the Siemens name. 
However, RCA was struggling to keep pace with IBM, and in 1971, after IBM announced en-
hancements to its System 360 family, it decided to withdraw from the industry.  Siemens then 
turned to CII as an alternative supplier. It put to the French government a plan for a partner-
ship which was later enlarged to include Philips of the Netherlands. The alliance, known as 
Unidata, seemed a promising venture in European cooperation, but was dogged from the 
start by disagreements among the partners about product strategy and about organisation. 
One solution might have been to convert the loose alliance into a separately managed, free-
standing company, but since the French share of such a company would be not much more 
than 25 per cent, this was not acceptable to the French authorities. Unidata was dissolved 
in 1974.56 
The French authorities were then able to negotiate what appeared to be a more satisfactory 
arrangement – a rapprochement with Bull. This company had been owned by General Elec-
tric since 1964, but like RCA, GE had found it impossible to compete profitably against IBM, 
and in 1970 it sold its computer division, including Bull, to another American company, Hon-
eywell. Honeywell was willing to participate in a new French company in which French in-
terests would hold a majority of the shares. Under an agreement signed in 1975 (after Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing had taken over the presidency of the Republic) CII-Honeywell-Bull was 
formed, with Honeywell holding 47 per cent and the balance by the French government and 
by CGE. (The two other shareholders in CII, Thomson and Schneider, withdrew). The Gis-
card administration was less enamoured of national champions than its predecessors, and 
although the government agreed to support the new company over a four-year period the 
expectation was that it would then be able to stand on its own feet. 
When Giscard entered office in 1974 he was determined to break with the interventionism of 
previous governments and to reduce the French industry’s dependence on financial support 
from the state.57  The goals of industrial policy were scaled back, with more focus on what was 
called la politique des crénaux – identifying particular sectors where French companies had 
a realistic prospect of gaining a worthwhile share of the world market. The Giscard admin-
istration was also willing to promote cooperation with American companies where it made 
industrial sense to do so. In semiconductors, for example, instead of relying wholly on Thom-
son, the government brought in other players, several of whom formed joint ventures with 
American producers. Two of the newcomers were Matra, one of Thomson’s rivals in defence 
electronics, and St Gobain, a large industrial group best known as a manufacturer of glass and 
building materials. (This was St Gobain’s first entry into an industry in which it had no pre-
vious experience, but which offered better growth prospects than its traditional activities.)  
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The new emphasis on competition did not imply a radical reordering of relations between 
industry and the state. Giscard was willing to invest in grands projets, using much the same 
approach as his predecessors had done. An outstanding example was the modernisation of 
the telephone system. Thanks to development work in the government research organisa-
tion, CNET, France had been the first country to install a fully electronic telephone exchange, 
the E10, and this technology, manufactured by the CGE subsidiary, Alcatel, became the basis 
for the transformation of what had been one of the most backward telephone systems in Eu-
rope. “As in other grands projets the state played the dominant role. It conducted R & D in a 
public research institution, financed a commercial prototype and provided a market through 
public procurement”.58  It was one of the great triumphs of Giscard’s presidency. 59   
Giscard might have gone further in a liberalising direction had it not been for the recession 
which followed the oil price increase in 1973/74. The government found itself under pressure 
to assist older industries which were in a dire financial situation because of falling demand. 
The worst crisis was in steel, still privately owned but heavily dependent on support from 
the government. In 1978 Giscard was forced to take effective control of the two biggest steel 
companies, Usinor and Sacilor, in order to save them from bankruptcy. With shipbuilding 
and other distressed sectors pressing for government assistance, “a state which had groomed 
national champions was now feeding ‘lame ducks’ ”. 60 
The government was also faced with another crisis in the computer industry. CII-Honey-
well-Bull had made progress in the first few years after its creation, but in 1979 disagree-
ments among the shareholders threatened to destabilise the company and the government 
was obliged to intervene. The outcome was the removal of CGE as the principal non-gov-
ernment French shareholder and its replacement by St Gobain. Although a newcomer to 
computers, St Gobain had the great attraction for the government of being strong enough 
financially to support CHB through to commercial viability. However, St Gobain’s arrival was 
almost immediately followed by a sharp fall in CHB’s profits, prompting the need for further 
government assistance.61      
With several other national champions also in financial trouble, French industry was not in 
a healthy condition at the time of the 1981 elections, which were won by a coalition of the 
Socialist and Communist parties. The leader of the coalition, François Mitterrand, was able 
to persuade a majority of the electorate that the solution to France’s industrial problems lay, 
not in more market, but in more state. 
France was not alone among European countries in facing economic difficulties in the sec-
ond half of the 1970s, and it was not surprising that the party in power during that period 
should suffer the electoral consequences. Yet the disappointing record of the Giscard presi-
dency did not detract from the progress which the French economy had made since the 
1950s. France was now a formidable industrial power, as De Gaulle had intended, and some 
strong national companies had been created. 
How much credit for the improvement in France’s industrial performance can be attributed 
to the “Colbertist” policies pursued by de Gaulle and Pompidou? Some economists believe 
that the crucial policy changes came at the end of the 1950s, with the creation of the Com-
mon Market, which for the first time exposed French industry to Europe-wide competition, 
and the adoption of a more rigorous approach to macroeconomic policy through the Rueff-
Pinay reforms. 62 The opportunities and pressures arising from a more competitive European 
market forced French industries to adapt, and some of them did so with notable success. The 
motor industry, for example, made a great leap forward during this period, with Renault 
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emerging as Volkswagen’s strongest competitor at the high-volume, low-price end of the 
market. Although Renault was owned by the state, this achievement cannot be attributed 
to industrial policy. Some mergers and acquisitions took place during this period (notably 
Peugeot’s purchase of Citroen, and its later takeover of Chrysler’s European operations), but, 
in contrast to the creation of British Leyland in the UK, they were not orchestrated by the 
government. Some left-wing politicians hoped that Renault and Peugeot might get together 
to form a French General Motors, but there was never any possibility that the fiercely inde-
pendent Peugeot family would contemplate becoming absorbed into a state-owned group.63 
Where the government did intervene to create a national champion, the results were mixed, 
with failures such as computers and machine tools64  offset by some successes as in tel-
ecommunications. Most of the successes were in infrastructure and defence-related projects 
where the French administrative system worked better than its British counterpart. Henry 
Ergas has suggested that part of the reason for French success in projects of this kind was 
“the great political legitimacy, operating autonomy and technical expertise of its end-user 
agencies, combined with the strong incentives for success built into the highly personalised 
nature of power and careers in the French public administration”.65  By contrast, the British 
system of public administration emphasised anonymity, committee decision making and 
administrative secrecy. Governments in the UK were “reluctant to devolve major projects 
to reasonably autonomous entities, so that responsibilities are tangled, decision making is 
cumbersome and the organisational and cultural context is inappropriate for developing 
new technologies”. 66    
There were, however, two disadvantages to the French approach. First, most of the national 
champions were heavily dependent on state-controlled markets which were insulated from 
international competition; how well would they perform if that protection was removed? 
Second, the bias in favour of large, nationally-owned companies distorted the allocation of 
the nation’s technical and human resources, and diverted attention from the need to nurture 
a strong tier of small- and medium-sized enterprises. This was a weakness in France’s indus-
trial structure, and one that “Colbertism” was ill-designed to correct.      
2.3. GERMANY
“If industrial policy is taken to mean a government’s active shaping of the industrial 
structure of a country and attempting to direct its permanent modernisation, then such a 
policy could not be said to exist in West Germany”.67  There were some departures from this 
non-interventionist stance, notably the decision to shield Germany’s high-cost coal industry 
from international competition68, and pressure for a more active industrial policy increased 
after the Social Democrats entered government in the 1970s. There were also some instances 
of intervention by Land governments to protect or support local companies. In general, how-
ever, state involvement in industry in the first thirty years after the war was considerably less 
than in France or the UK. 
The Christian Democrat government which took power in 1949 did not seek to extend the 
public sector through nationalisation. It inherited some state-owned companies, such as 
Volkswagen, from the Nazi regime, but most of them were later wholly or partially privatised. 
The railways (Deutsche Bundesbahn) and the telephone system (part of Deutsche Bundes-
post) were in the public sector, but, in contrast to the UK and France, electricity and gas were 
largely in the hands of private sector companies. 
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The German economic miracle that began in the 1950s was not the result of industrial policy, 
but underpinned by a broader set of policies of which the promotion of competition and 
openness to foreign trade were probably the most important. To a much greater extent than 
France or the UK, Germany was the pace-setter for trade liberalisation in Europe.
Some of Germany’s institutions, such as the vocational training system and the close coop-
eration between banks and industry, had deep historical roots. There was continuity, too, 
in science policy. There had been a long tradition of state support for scientific research, in 
universities and in government research laboratories, through the Max Planck Society. These 
arrangements were reinforced after the war by the creation of the Fraunhofer Society, which 
acted as a bridge between basic research in public laboratories and applied research in indus-
try.69  After a slow start it grew into a substantial organisation, closely linked to universities 
but mainly carrying out applied research on behalf of clients in industry and government. 
It was part of Germany’s diffusion-oriented technology policy, aimed at encouraging wide-
spread access to technical expertise and reducing the costs which small- and medium-sized 
firms faced in adjusting to change.70  
The industries which made the biggest contribution to Germany’s export success were for 
the most part ones in which Germany had a long-established competitive advantage. Ger-
man entrepreneurs had been the leaders in the development of the modern, science-based 
chemical industry in the second half of the nineteenth century, and this sector continued to 
be a source of strength after the Second World War. When the three big companies that had 
been part of I G Farben – Bayer, Hoechst and BASF - were set up as independent enterprises 
in the early 1950s, they soon re-established a leading position in the world market, alongside 
DuPont, Dow and Monsanto in the US and ICI in the UK. In electrical engineering Siemens 
and AEG quickly recovered from the war, and although AEG was later to enter a prolonged 
period of decline, Siemens became a European leader in power engineering, telecommunica-
tions equipment and some branches of electronics. 
A third area of strength was non-electrical machinery, and here the dynamism came mainly 
from small- and medium-sized firms – the Mittelstand.  Their success was based on techni-
cal excellence, a highly skilled workforce, and specialisation in particular segments of the 
market. This was a decentralised industrial order in which firms “enjoyed dense and over-
lapping ties with a whole array of institutions dedicated to providing them with technologi-
cal and market information, highly trained people, and contact with other producers with 
complementary expertise”. 71
The motor industry, which had been something of a laggard before the war, was one of the 
principal beneficiaries of the opening-up of the European market, thanks in part to the spec-
tacular success of Volkswagen. Owned until 1960 by the state but managed without political 
interference, this company applied Fordist mass-production techniques with such success 
that the Beetle became by the mid-1960s the world’s best-selling car. The government had 
no direct influence on Volkswagen’s strategy 72, or on the policies pursued by the two lead-
ing producers of luxury cars, BMW and Daimler-Benz. Some of the smaller car makers were 
absorbed by the large groups during the 1960s, but the rationalisation of the industry took 
place without government involvement. 
In all these industries, industrial policy as practised in the UK and France was virtually non-
existent. They were also industries which fitted well with the distinctive characteristics of 
the German business system: close links between companies and banks; limited recourse to 
equity markets; continuous investment in workforce skills; and patient, long-term invest-
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ment in the development of new products and processes. By contrast, Germany did not pro-
vide a conducive environment for industries such as computers and semiconductors where 
there was much greater technological uncertainty.  
Germany made a slow start in high-technology industries after the war because of the re-
strictions imposed by the Allied authorities. These controls were lifted in 1955, and at that 
point the government sought to recover the ground that had been lost. A new government 
department – the Ministry for Atomic Questions – was created to support development work 
in nuclear energy; its responsibilities were later extended to encompass space research. In 
1962 it was converted into the Ministry of Research and Technology (BMFT).   
An early target was the computer industry. Several German companies, including Siemens, 
had introduced their own computers in the late 1950s, but they were making little headway 
against IBM. The BMFT launched its first Data Processing Programme in 1967, providing 
financial support for R & D in computer hardware. Most of the money went to Siemens and 
AEG, and the Ministry tried without success to persuade the two companies to merge their 
computer operations. As noted earlier, Siemens formed an alliance with RCA, and later helped 
to set up the short-lived Unidata partnership. When that venture collapsed it turned to Fujitsu 
of Japan as the supplier of IBM-compatible mainframe computers at the top end of the range. 
The only genuine German success in computers during this period came from an entrepre-
neurial newcomer, Nixdorf, which specialised in small business systems, a largely uncon-
tested market which Siemens had neglected. Although Nixdorf received some support from 
the BMFT in the second half of the 1970s, it was not dependent on the patronage of the state.73 
In nuclear power the two principal contenders were again Siemens and AEG, both of which 
entered the industry by obtaining licences from US companies and later developing their 
own technology. Although they received some support from the BMFT, most of the Min-
istry’s efforts were devoted to reactor types – principally the fast breeder reactor – which 
turned out to be of little commercial value. The companies were sceptical about the fast 
breeder, and reluctant to invest in it. 74 Siemens’s subsequent success in nuclear reactors 
owed little to government support.
In the aircraft industry, German companies which had been among Europe’s leading manu-
facturers before the war were eager to get back into the market as soon as the restrictions 
were lifted. They had a powerful supporter in Franz-Josef Strauss, who as Federal Minister 
of Defence from 1956 to 1962 and later as Minister President of Bavaria (where several of the 
companies were based) worked hard to revive the industry. The first step was to negotiate 
an agreement with the US for the manufacture under licence of the Lockheed Starfighter. 
Government support for civil aircraft projects began in 1962, but progress was slow, partly 
because of the fragmentation of the industry; there were seven independent aircraft build-
ers in the 1960s. One of them, VFW, formed a partnership with Fokker in the Netherlands 
to make a short-haul airliner, the VFW 614, but it was not successful; the programme was 
cancelled after costing the taxpayer some DM1bn. 
The first moves towards rationalisation came at the end of the 1960s with the creation of 
Messerschmidt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB), and it was this group, together with VFW and Dorn-
ier, that became the German partner in the Airbus consortium. A new company, Deutsche 
Airbus Gmbh, was formed, with Strauss as chairman of the board. The German aircraft in-
dustry relied on support from the Federal and Land governments; apart from coal mining, it 
was the most heavily subsidised sector of German industry. 
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As Otto Keck has written, “the federal government was hesitant in assuming responsibilities 
for science and technology, and where it did, as in nuclear power, aerospace and electronic 
data processing, its programmes for supporting industrial technology were ineffective”.75 
But if Germany’s forays into interventionist industrial policy between the 1950s and the 
1970s were mostly unsuccessful, they were too small to have much impact on the wider econ-
omy. Germany avoided the mistakes made in France and the UK, and its industrial strength 
continued to be based on medium-technology sectors in which interventionist policy had 
played no part.   
2.4. INDUSTRIAL POLICY AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the industrial policies pursued in the UK, France and 
Germany were largely national in character. Although there was some cross-border coop-
eration, as with Concorde and Airbus and the abortive Unidata venture, these were inter-
governmental arrangements which did not involve the European Commission. The Treaty 
of Rome had said nothing about industrial or technology policy. The separate treaty that set 
up the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) was intended to provide a coordi-
nating framework for nuclear research, but virtually all Europe’s research in this area was 
conducted outside Euratom by national governments.76  
The first steps towards a European technology policy came in the mid-1960s with the crea-
tion by the Commission of a committee known as Prest (Politique de Recherche Scientifique 
et Technologique) to explore the possibility of a common research policy among member 
states. This was a time of growing concern over the failure of European countries to fund 
scientific and technical research on the same scale as the US.77 Various plans were put for-
ward at this time, including a proposal from Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister, for a 
European technological community, to which the UK would contribute its expertise in areas 
such as aerospace and electronics. Without action on this front, Wilson warned that Europe 
faced the prospect of an “industrial helotry”, with European industry producing “only the 
conventional apparatus of the modern economy, while becoming increasingly dependent 
on American business for the sophisticated apparatus which will increasingly call the tune 
in the 70s and 80s”.78 Wilson hoped this argument would strengthen the case for British 
membership of the Common Market, but his application, like that of his predecessor Harold 
Macmillan, was vetoed by General de Gaulle, and his ideas on research won little support 
from other European countries. 
Some progress was made in the Prest committee, and the appointment of Altiero Spinelli in 
1970 as the Commissioner responsible for industry and for research and technology led to 
more ambitious plans for cooperation in this area. Although nothing much came of Spinelli’s 
initiative, which involved a greater degree of centralisation than was acceptable to member 
states, his successor, Ralf Dahrendorf, brought a more pragmatic approach, and by the early 
1970s a new framework had been established in the form of COST (European Cooperation 
in the Field of Scientific and Technical Research) through which European governments, 
together with the Commission, funded a number of collaborative research projects.79  
The principal obstacle to progress was the reluctance of governments, especially in the larger 
countries, to subordinate their national interests to those of Europe as a whole. As one ob-
server wrote, “European technological cooperation failed in the 1960s because European 
governments wanted to have their cake and eat it. They wanted the benefits of technologi-
cal cooperation without paying the political costs necessary for these benefits to be reaped. 
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These political costs were the removal of protection for national firms in public markets for 
‘strategic’ technologies, an explicit willingness to become more dependent on European 
neighbours and a revision of the habit of turning to the USA when national technological 
programmes failed”.80   
These obstacles to cooperation were evident in the largely abortive attempt to develop a 
European approach to space technology. In 1961 six European countries – the UK, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Belgium – set up the European Launcher Development 
Organisation, followed a year later by the European Space Research Organisation, but there 
was a lack of clarity about objectives and little progress was made. By the end of the decade 
“the European space programme was a shambles”. 81      
By this time officials in Brussels were beginning to make the case for a European industrial 
policy. One of the first Commission documents on this subject, the Colonna memorandum of 
1970, noted the surge of US investment in Europe, especially in high-technology industries, 
and warned that European-owned firms could find themselves limited to “traditional”, that 
is, low-technology, activities.82 The memorandum pointed out that the main beneficiaries 
of the reductions in tariffs within the Common Market had been consumer goods produc-
ers. “Industries which make use of the major new technologies do not feel the same benefit 
of the customs union inasmuch as – since their development depends on public funds and 
orders – they cannot so easily break out of their national market”. The report proposed that 
the creation of cross-national European companies should be made easier through changes 
in company law. 
No concrete action resulted from the Colonna memorandum, but in the second half of the 
1970s the case for a European approach to some industrial problems became stronger as a 
result of the crisis in steel. This was an industry over which the Commission, through the Eu-
ropean Coal and Steel Community, had supervisory powers. The collapse in demand that fol-
lowed the 1974/75 recession created a very difficult situation for the steelmakers to which the 
Commission had to respond. Under the 1977 Davignon Plan, named after the Commissioner 
for Industry, Étienne Davignon, the steel companies were made subject to strict controls on 
pricing, and restrained from adding new capacity. The aim was to stabilise the market and to 
bring capacity into line with expected demand. 
Steel was one of several troubled industries that looked to the Commission for help during 
this period. As one commentator remarked, European companies and their governments 
were evidently prepared to look for Europe-wide solutions in the so-called “sunset” in-
dustries such as steel and shipbuilding, while keeping firm national control over “sunrise” 
industries such as computers.83 However, Davignon, a powerful figure on the Commission 
between 1978 and 1982, believed that Community action to help growth industries was as 
important as the restructuring of industries in trouble. “In the aerospace industry, in data 
processing and in other areas”, he said, “opening up markets and pooling industrial capacity 
will be necessary to reach the scale required by international competition”.84 Davignon was 
the prime mover in establishing the new framework for technological cooperation which 
was to take shape in the early 1980s.
  
2.5. EUROPEAN INDUSTRY AND ITS COMPETITORS IN 1980
The first thirty years after the war saw a surge in European productivity growth; by the 
mid-1970s GDP per hour worked in Europe was just under 80 per cent of the US level, com-
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pared to 44 per cent in 1950.85  The improvement owed a great deal to trade liberalisation 
and a generally favourable international environment, but little if anything to interventionist 
industrial policy. The country which intervened least, West Germany, did best. Moreover, 
whether or not the desire to catch up with the US in high-technology industries was a le-
gitimate objective – and on this issue politics and national prestige weighed at least as much 
as economics - little progress had been made. In aerospace and computers, which had been 
heavily subsidised by European governments, American firms were still far ahead. At the 
same time attempts to ease the problems of depressed industries through government in-
tervention had tended to slow down necessary change, at considerable cost to the taxpayer. 
The clear lesson from European industrial policy in the 1960s and 1970s was that govern-
ments had overrated the risks and costs of market failures and underestimated those associ-
ated with government failures. As an OECD study pointed out, an apparent market failure 
– for example, the reluctance of firms to invest in risky high-technology projects – did not 
in itself justify government action. “It is necessary to ascertain beforehand that such action 
can be more effective than the market solution, however imperfect, and that the appropriate 
means can be mobilised”.86  
There had also been a dubious assumption, especially in France and the UK, that there were 
technologies which a country somehow needed to have and which in the absence of con-
certed government action it would not acquire; that these technologies could be discovered 
by administrative process; and that they would be more effectively secured by centralised ef-
fort than through the “duplication” and “waste” which characterised competitive markets.87 
Anxiety about US domination had been a strong influence on policy-makers throughout this 
period, but the response failed to take account of the special features of the US market. Part 
of the explanation for the American lead in computers and semiconductors was that in the 
early post-war years, when these industries were in their formative stage, US manufacturers 
benefited from a large demand arising from military and space exploration programmes. In 
civil aerospace, the size of the US market, and the existence of numerous competing airlines, 
gave US manufacturers an advantage that was not available to their European counterparts. 
No less important were supportive policies and institutions, including a financial system that 
gave start-up and early-stage firms ready access to capital. Another factor was the willing-
ness of the Federal government and its agencies, including the military, to encourage new 
entrants, instead of relying on large, established companies as their European counterparts 
generally did.    
American success could not be ascribed to industrial or technology policy. “Historically US 
technology ‘policy’ has been the outcome of loosely coordinated and often inconsistent de-
cisions made in diverse policy areas designed to further the missions of individual federal 
agencies. These policies were motivated more by national security concerns than by any 
comprehensive economic strategy”.88 In general the US government did not try to plan and 
coordinate broad civilian technologies, and where it did so the results were disappointing.89 
Where mistakes were made, the US was usually quick to acknowledge them; for example, 
development work on a supersonic airliner, begun in direct response to Concorde, was dis-
continued in 1971 before expensive commitments had been made.90    
European governments might have done better if they had focused less on the size of US 
companies and more on the institutional framework in which they were operating. But to-
wards the end of the period there was another model which was beginning to attract interest 
in Europe.
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2.5.1. THE RISE OF JAPAN
When the Japanese economic miracle began in the 1950s it was first attributed to low 
labour costs. Then, as companies such as Sony and Toyota increased their share of Western 
markets, attention focused on Japanese management practices – lean production, continu-
ous improvement, just-in-time supply systems. But there was also a perception that, in catch-
ing up with the US in high-technology industries, the Japanese had developed an industrial 
policy that avoided the mistakes made in the UK and France.91 In computers, for example, 
the Japanese authorities, instead of creating a single national champion, had encouraged 
the established companies in the industry to cooperate in pre-competitive research but to 
compete fiercely against one another in the market. This policy, known as controlled com-
petition, had originated before the war in telecommunications, and was applied after 1945 
to other high-technology industries.92   
Japan’s experience, and that of other late-industrialising East Asian countries which par-
tially imitated Japan, suggested that industrial policy could be a source of competitive advan-
tage if it was well designed and skilfully implemented. A distinctive feature of the East Asian 
approach, especially in Korea and Taiwan, was the focus on exports both as an objective and 
as the criterion which determined whether or not companies would receive support from 
the state. In Europe governments tended to continue supporting their national champions 
in the hope that they would become competitive but without making support contingent on 
performance. 
The rise of Japanese industry seemed unstoppable at the end of the 1970s, prompting some 
extravagant predictions such as those contained in Ezra Vogel’s best-seller, Japan as Number 
One. In the blurb to this book a former US ambassador to Japan wrote: “Japan has a more 
smoothly functioning society and an economy that is running rings round ours”. The sup-
posed advantages of the Japanese model prompted several initiatives in European industrial 
policy during the 1980s. 
3. THE SECOND PHASE: FROM THE 1980S TO THE EARLY 2000S
In the early 1980s the term “eurosclerosis” came into common use. Most European coun-
tries were suffering from rising unemployment and high inflation; it was clear that new 
policies were needed to inject greater dynamism into the European economy. This period 
coincided with a shift in macroeconomic policy away from Keynesian demand management 
towards a stronger focus on monetary stability and low inflation. In microeconomic policy 
the disappointing results of direct intervention in industry in the earlier post-war decades 
strengthened the argument for a greater reliance on markets.  
At the European level the change in thinking about how economies should be organised 
was reflected in a series of measures aimed at removing the remaining barriers to the cross-
border movement of goods and capital. But alongside the drive for a more integrated Eu-
ropean market there was also a revival of interest in European industrial policy. While the 
“technology gap” with the US was still a matter of concern, Japan seemed to have evolved 
an approach to industrial competitiveness which could usefully be imitated in Europe. In 
high-technology industries, in particular, Japanese-style inter-company collaboration was 
seen as one of the ways in which European industry could recover lost ground. 
Admiration for Japan was not confined to Europe. During the 1980s several economists in 
the US, worried about the inroads which Japanese companies were making in industries 
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previously dominated by American firms, argued that an industrial policy along Japanese 
lines was essential if a continuing decline in high-technology sectors was to be avoided.93 In 
1987 the Department of Defense agreed to fund a consortium of semiconductor producers, 
known as Sematech, in the hope that through cooperative research the industry could de-
velop cutting-edge technologies which would put them ahead of their Japanese competitors. 
Sematech did not achieve what its sponsors had hoped, partly because the participants could 
not agree on what the research programme should consist of.94 The organisation continued 
to exist, but its role became one of encouraging closer cooperation between semiconductor 
producers and their equipment suppliers. The subsequent revival of the US semiconductor 
industry owed little to inter-firm collaboration or to support from the federal government. 95
Whether industrial policy contributed significantly to Japan’s economic success in the 1970s 
and 1990s remains a matter of controversy96, but by the early 1990s the attractions of the 
Japanese model were in any case fading as that country entered a period of economic stag-
nation that was to last for more than a decade. The pendulum swung back to the US. From 
the mid-1990s onwards there was a remarkable surge in US productivity growth, and the 
principal source of the improvement was the speed at which American firms were exploit-
ing the latest advances in information technology, including the internet. After a long period 
in which Europe had been getting steadily closer to US productivity levels, the gap began to 
widen; Europe seemed stuck in the slow lane while the US was roaring ahead.97 The strength 
of the US was now seen to lie, not in the existence of giant companies such as IBM or General 
Motors, but in a set of institutions and policies that encouraged the exploitation of new tech-
nologies and the rapid redeployment of resources from low-growth to high-growth sectors 
of the economy. 
Although the enthusiasm for the “new economy” went too far, creating a stock market bubble 
in the shares of internet-related companies which collapsed in 2000, this did not undermine 
the attractions of the US model. In the years leading up to the financial crisis of 2008-09 the 
US lead in high-growth, high-technology industries seemed unassailable, prompting Euro-
pean governments to try to reshape their institutions along American lines. 
3.1. THE UK
Margaret Thatcher, who became Prime Minister in May 1979, is generally seen as the 
standard-bearer for the “neo-liberal” philosophy which had a profound influence on eco-
nomic policy, in developing countries as well as in the industrial world, during the 1980s 
and 1990s. Although the continuities with previous British administrations were greater 
than is often supposed, it is certainly true that in some key areas “Thatcherism” involved 
a reordering of economic priorities. The focus was on controlling inflation and on keep-
ing public expenditure under control, even at the expense of higher unemployment. At the 
micro-economic level, competition was to be the principal instrument for improving indus-
trial efficiency. Most of the industries that had been nationalised by Labour, including steel, 
shipbuilding and aerospace, were privatised. More striking was the decision to privatise and 
deregulate state-owned utilities which had previously been regarded as natural monopolies 
and unsuitable for private ownership. The most spectacular success was the privatisation of 
British Telecom in 1984.98  
An important consequence of privatisation was that the utilities were no longer obliged to buy 
equipment from British suppliers; what had been a cosy supplier/customer relationship be-
came a much more competitive market. In telecommunications, for example, British Telecom 
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brought in a Swedish company, Ericsson, to compete against the British suppliers of switch-
ing equipment. After electricity privatisation in 1990, Siemens and other Continental power 
engineering companies became major suppliers to the newly privatised generating firms.  
Whereas Labour had sought to nurture and protect British-owned firms in supposedly stra-
tegic industries, the Thatcher government was only too pleased to sell off loss-making na-
tional champions to foreign acquirers. The Prime Minister raised no objection when Ford 
bought British Leyland’s Jaguar subsidiary in 1984, and two years later she might have sold 
the rest of British Leyland to Ford and General Motors had there not been a sudden upsurge 
of patriotic fervour on the Conservative back benches which forced her to withdraw the 
proposal. 99  Rover, the successor company to British Leyland, was sold to British Aerospace 
and later re-sold to BMW of Germany in 1994.100 The Leyland truck business was bought by 
Paccar of the US in 1998. 
Mrs Thatcher wanted to make the UK more attractive to foreign investors, and she was indif-
ferent as to whether their investment took the form of building new factories or acquiring 
British companies. There was a warm welcome for the three Japanese companies, Honda, 
Toyota and Nissan, when they decided to build factories in the UK as the base for supplying 
European markets. Thanks to Mrs Thatcher’s reforms the labour relations climate had be-
come more stable and the Japanese companies achieved productivity levels in their British 
factories comparable to their domestic plants. 
The government also sought to encourage home-grown ventures, but to do so not by sup-
porting particular industries or firms but by creating an environment that would be more 
supportive of entrepreneurs. The growth of the venture capital industry was stimulated by 
tax changes, and the government persuaded the London Stock Exchange to improve the 
supply of equity finance for young, fast-growing firms. A partial success was the rise of new 
biotechnology firms, seeking to commercialise the results of academic science. (This group 
included Celltech, now wholly owned by private investors.) Although none of these firms 
were as successful as their counterparts in the US, they reflected a shift away from the ear-
lier focus on creating bigger industrial groups. In information technology the 1980s saw the 
emergence of a promising cluster of innovative firms around Cambridge University, in the 
area that became known as Silicon Fen.101    
The hands-off policy towards industry did not preclude some continuing support for in-
vestment in advanced technology. In information technology, for example, the government 
accepted the argument that some injection of public funds might be necessary to strengthen 
a sector in which British firms were lagging behind their American competitors. The Alvey 
programme, aimed at encouraging collaborative projects between industry and academia, 
was set up in 1983 with a budget fixed at £350m over five years of which £200m was to come 
from the taxpayer.102  The programme increased the amount of spending on information 
technology research, in both public and private sectors, but did little to improve the interna-
tional competitiveness of British companies.103  
The Thatcher government sold the NEB’s shareholding in ICL soon after taking office, but 
it was still willing to support the company, on a strictly limited basis. ICL was faced with a 
widening gap between its profits and the amount of R & D expenditure that was necessary 
to keep its products competitive. With private investors reluctant to put up more funds, the 
government agreed to provide a two-year guarantee for a £200m loan which ICL had negoti-
ated with the banks.104 The loan was subsequently repaid without the guarantee having to be 
used, and the government was not involved in ICL’s subsequent decisions. In 1984 Standard 
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Telephones and Cables (STC), a telecommunications equipment company, took over ICL, 
which thereby became part of a diversified electronics group. The merger did not work well, 
and in 1990 STC sold 80 per cent of ICL to Fujitsu of Japan. Under Japanese control the 
company shifted the balance of its business towards information systems and services, with 
only a limited involvement in hardware.105    
Several other branches of the electronics industry passed into foreign control during this 
period. In consumer electronics, several TV set producers had formed alliances during the 
1970s with the increasingly dominant Japanese manufacturers, and the National Economic 
Development Office had hoped that these alliances might provide the basis for a modern, 
competitive industry with a substantial British component. By the end of the 1980s, how-
ever, these joint ventures had passed into the control of the Japanese partners, while Thorn-
EMI, the largest British manufacturer, sold its TV set business to Thomson, the state-owned 
French electronics group.  “The prospect of a government-backed and subsidized moderni-
sation programme which NEDO had envisaged in 1978 had given way to a non-intervention-
ist policy in which the Thatcher government left adjustment almost entirely to the firms”. 106 
In semiconductors, as noted earlier, Inmos was sold to SGS-Thomson, the Franco-Italian 
group, leaving GEC as the only significant British-owned producer. GEC did not compete in 
the high-volume segments of the semiconductor market, specialising mainly in devices used 
in military applications. The bulk of the market was supplied either by imports, principally 
from the US and Japan, or by the local subsidiaries of non-British firms such as Siemens and 
Fujitsu. The argument on which the creation of Inmos had been based, that the UK needed a 
nationally-owned producer of semiconductors competing in the mainstream of the industry, 
no longer carried weight with the government.    
The only industry where the Thatcher government deemed national ownership to be essen-
tial, on grounds of national security, was aerospace. British Aerospace and Rolls-Royce were 
privatised, but they were protected from foreign takeover by special provisions in their arti-
cles of association. The government did not seek to influence their strategy, but they contin-
ued to enjoy close links with Ministry of Defence and to receive launch aid for civil projects.
Outside aerospace, the government was content to allow the structure and ownership of 
industry to be determined by the market. Some observers criticized this approach on the 
grounds that it neglected “the central importance of building durable technological capa-
bilities”.107  Not only was government spending on R & D cut back, but “by privatising high-
technology producers (mainly in aerospace) and users (utilities) the government lessened, 
by choice, its direct influence over technological decisions”. Its acquiescence in the sale of 
Inmos and ICL to non-British companies reflected “a growing reluctance to play a part in 
identifying and supporting the technologies that may have strategic value, whether in terms 
of supply security or their potential economic importance in the future”.  These arguments 
carried no weight with the Thatcher government.
After Mrs Thatcher resigned in 1990 – the Conservatives remained in office, led by John Ma-
jor, until 1997 – there was a brief renaissance of industrial policy when one of Mrs Thatcher’s 
fiercest critics, Michael Heseltine, was put in charge of the Department of Trade and Indus-
try. Heseltine, an admirer of what he saw as Japanese industrial policy, sought to rebuild that 
department as a driver of industrial modernisation; his role, as he saw it, was to “help British 
industry to win”. However, although the DTI strengthened its links with industry and intro-
duced some new support schemes the amounts of money involved were small. Heseltine’s 
period at the DTI did not represent a significant departure from Thatcherite policies.                       
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More surprisingly, the Labour government which took office in 1997 did not reverse Mrs 
Thatcher’s reforms. By this time the Labour Party, thanks to Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, 
had shed its traditional aversion to markets. “New Labour” had no intention of recreating 
the National Enterprise Board, still less of taking major industries into public ownership. 
In a White Paper published in 1998 the government declared that it would not resort to the 
interventionist policies of the past. “In the industrial policy-making of the 1960s and 1970s, 
to be modern meant believing in planning. Now, meeting the requirements of the knowledge-
driven economy means making markets work better”.108  
The need to catch up with the US had been part of the rationale for the creation of large 
industrial groups in the 1960s and 1970s. Now the emphasis was on horizontal policies – 
improving the supply of finance for entrepreneurs, providing tax incentives for research 
and development, encouraging investment in training – rather than support for individual 
firms. There was also a greater emphasis on competition. The 1998 Competition Act gave the 
authorities stronger powers to root out anti-competitive practices, with heavier penalties for 
companies found guilty of breaking the rules; competition policy was tightened further in the 
2002 Enterprise Act. Labour also built on what the Conservatives had done in deregulating 
the public utilities; in the telecommunications, the Communications Act of 2003 made it 
easier for new entrants to challenge the incumbent.109   
Did this mean that competition policy had taken precedence over industrial policy? The 
Labour government wanted to encourage high-value-added sectors of industry, and this in-
volved some support for particular sectors - for example, biotechnology – but on a modest 
scale. Technology policy mostly took the form of horizontal measures, including the intro-
duction of a tax credit for research and development and an increase in the science budget. 
To the dismay of some business leaders, there was no attempt to slow down the shift of 
employment from manufacturing to services; indeed, the shift accelerated during Labour’s 
period in office. The government also continued to welcome inward investment, even if it 
led to major industrial companies passing into foreign control.110  
An example of Labour’s hands-off stance – and one which highlights the difference between 
the French and British approach to industrial policy – was the demise of GEC. Created by the 
IRC-influenced mergers of the late 1960s, this company had been built up by its long-serving 
managing director, Lord Weinstock, into one of the country’s largest and most profitable 
industrial groups. In 1996, when Weinstock retired, it had three main businesses: power engi-
neering, which since 1989 had been part of a joint venture, known as GEC-Alsthom, with the 
French company, CGE; telecommunications equipment, in which Siemens had a 40 per cent 
stake; and defence electronics, which was wholly owned by GEC. Weinstock’s successors 
took the view that GEC was too diversified and should concentrate on the business which 
seemed to have the best growth prospects, telecommunications. Between 1998 and 2001 the 
company divested defence electronics; floated GEC-Alsthom as an independent company 
(it was renamed Alstom); bought Siemens’s 40 per cent stake in the telecommunications 
company and acquired, at a high price, two telecommunications equipment suppliers in the 
US. The name of the company was changed to Marconi to signal its new vocation.
The US acquisitions were justified on the grounds that the demand for telecommunications 
services, driven by the internet, would continue to increase at a rapid rate. This was a pe-
riod of euphoria about the “new economy”, with shares in internet and telecommunications 
companies being driven to extravagant heights on European and American stock markets. 
When the boom collapsed in 2000, Marconi was in a difficult situation. For the next few years 
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it tried to resuscitate its telecommunications business, but without success. The final blow 
came in 2005 when BT (the new name for British Telecom), which had been one of GEC’s 
biggest customers, excluded Marconi from a large contract for the modernisation of the 
British telecommunications network; all the orders went to non-British firms. A few months 
later what was left of Marconi was bought by Ericsson of Sweden.   
The British side of Alstom, the Anglo-French power engineering company, had also been 
losing ground, partly because of a dearth of orders from British electricity companies. Al-
stom itself ran into a serious crisis in 2002, and would not have survived as an independent 
company had it not been rescued by the French government. Thanks to this support, Alstom 
survived the crisis and continues to be an international player both in power engineering and 
in railway equipment. Its former British partner, GEC, no longer exists. 111   
It is doubtful whether the British government could have done anything to save GEC even 
if it had wished to do so, but some observers in the UK saw this episode as another example 
of the apparent indifference of successive governments to the demise of some of the coun-
try’s important industrial companies. Yet calls for a French-style industrial policy were ig-
nored by Labour, as they had been by the Conservatives before 1997. The case for persisting 
with a market-based, non-interventionist approach to industrial change was strengthened 
by the fact that, since these policies had been adopted, British economic performance had 
improved. As an American study pointed out, “the evidence shows that the United Kingdom 
made greater market reforms than most other advanced countries (in the 1980s and 1990s); 
arrested the nearly century-long trend of economic decline relative to its historic competi-
tors, Germany and France; and improved the place of the United Kingdom in the economic 
league tables”.112  A later paper noted that by 2007, shortly before the financial crisis, GDP per 
head in the UK was just above French and German levels. The biggest single reason for the 
improvement in performance, according to the author, was the replacement of the pre-1980 
policies of protection by a new emphasis on competition.113  
What was also true was that, since the 1980s, the structure of the economy had evolved in a 
different way from that of comparable European countries, with a faster decline in manufac-
turing than, for example, in Germany and a greater reliance on financial and other business 
services as a source of employment and of foreign earnings. A positive view of these devel-
opments was that the UK was shifting resources into activities where it had a competitive 
advantage. But could services, especially tradable services, grow fast enough to offset the 
continuing decline of manufacturing? Anxieties on this score, already apparent before the 
financial crisis, were intensified by the events of 2008 and 2009. The issue that then came 
to the fore was whether the economy needed to be “rebalanced”, and, if so, whether there 
might be a role for industrial policy. 
3.2. FRANCE
In France the 1981 elections brought into power a left-wing government, led by François 
Mitterrand, whose approach to industrial policy, and to the management of the economy as a 
whole, could not have been more different from that of the Thatcher government in the UK. 
Its first step was to set in train a programme of “redistributive Keynesianism”114  - reflating 
the economy through increased government spending, new measures to create jobs for the 
unemployed and more generous benefits for low-income families. Then came a sweeping 
programme of nationalisation, which gave the government full control of thirteen of the 
country’s twenty largest industrial companies, including CGE, Thomson, Rhône-Poulenc 
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and St Gobain, and a majority stake in several others. The plan was to use the state sector 
as le fer de lance, a means of strengthening the ability of French companies to compete in 
international markets. Detailed plans were drawn up for individual industries; in the case 
of electronics no less than eleven branches of the industry were identified as worthy of sup-
port, including not only computers and semiconductors, but TV sets, industrial automation, 
scientific instruments and medical electronics. 115 This was la politique de filière, aimed at 
strengthening the selected industries at all stages in the value chain – much more ambitious 
than Giscard’s politique des crénaux.  
Nationalisation allowed the government to inject much-needed new capital into companies 
which had been weakened by the recession.116  The authorities were also able to bring about 
some asset swaps, so that the state-owned companies could focus on a narrower range of 
businesses. In the electrical/electronics sector, for example, Thomson ceded its telecom-
munications business to CGE, while taking over CGE’s interests in defence electronics and 
electronic components. St Gobain was required to abandon its newly acquired interests in 
computers and semiconductors and to return to its traditional activities. Rhône-Poulenc 
withdrew from petrochemicals and acquired additional businesses in pharmaceuticals and 
fine chemicals.
At a time when the world economy was still recovering from the second oil shock, Mitter-
rand’s dash for growth in 1981-82 was risky, and it was not long before the French economy 
began to suffer strains. The balance of payments went into deficit, the franc came under 
pressure in the foreign exchange markets, and inflation increased. In 1983 Mitterrand was 
forced to make a historic U-turn in the direction of financial orthodoxy. As Jonah Levy has 
written, “a leftist administration that had been elected just two years earlier on a campaign 
to intensify dirigisme began instead to dismantle dirigisme.”117  
The decisions taken in 1983 marked the start of a reorientation of French industrial policy 
which was to be taken further by the right-wing government led by Jacques Chirac which 
held office between 1986 and 1988. (This was the first of several periods of “cohabitation”, 
with the presidency in the hands of one party and the government in the hands of the other.) 
The new government promptly set about a privatisation programme, drawing up a list of 
sixty five enterprises that were to be returned to the private sector. Some of them, including 
CGE and St Gobain, were successfully floated, but the process was put on hold by the stock 
market crash of October, 1987. Only two more companies were privatised before the right-
wing government lost power in the 1988 elections; in the same year Mitterrand was elected 
to a second presidential term.
Scarred by the experience of 1981-83, the Socialists had no intention of reviving their nation-
alisation programme. Instead, they pursued the so-called ni-ni policy – neither privatisa-
tion nor nationalisation – although they did allow state-owned firms to raise capital from 
the market in the form of non-voting shares. Both the privatised companies and those that 
remained in the public sector were for the most part free to develop and implement their 
strategies without interference from the state. Most of them opted for specialisation and 
internationalisation, concentrating on their stronger businesses and giving them a global 
dimension, often through acquisitions in the US as well as in Europe. 
CGE, for example, focused on two areas: telecommunications equipment through Alcatel, 
and power engineering and rail transport through Alsthom. After the acquisition of Thom-
son’s telecommunications interests in 1983, CGE’s next step was what came to be known 
as the deal of the century, the purchase of ITT’s European subsidiaries. Completed in 1987, 
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this purchase lifted CGE into the front rank of the world’s telecommunications equipment 
manufacturers, not far behind A T & T in the US. In power engineering, CGE formed a 50-50 
partnership with its British counterpart, GEC; GEC-Alsthom, was established in 1989. The 
French parent was renamed Alcatel Alsthom in 1991. 
The name of the company was changed again to Alcatel in 1998 after the power engineering 
business was floated on the stock market. Now specialising mainly in telecommunications 
equipment, Alcatel continued to expand outside Europe. In 2006 it concluded one of the 
biggest trans-Atlantic transactions when it merged with Lucent Technologies in the US. (Lu-
cent, previously known as Western Electric, had been the manufacturing arm of American 
Telephone and Telegraph, but had been hived off as a separate company in 1996.) The name 
was changed yet again to Alcatel-Lucent. 
CGE’s traditional rival, Thomson, was not included in the first wave of privatisations; its 
portfolio contained some loss-making businesses which would not be attractive to the pri-
vate sector. Thomson made most of its money in defence electronics through CSF, but it 
also had stakes in electronic components and in consumer electronics. Since the Plan Cal-
cul of the 1960s the semiconductor industry had been regarded by successive governments 
as strategically important, and under the Socialist administration between 1981 and 1986 
Thomson’s semiconductor subsidiary was given substantial support in the hope that through 
acquisitions and new investment it would lift its share of the world market to at least 3 per 
cent, regarded as the minimum necessary for viability. But Thomson’s strategy, which in-
cluded the takeover of an American company, Mostek, in 1986, was over-ambitious, and the 
semiconductor division continued to lose money. Finally, in 1987, it was put into a joint ven-
ture with an Italian state-owned component producer, SGS Microelettronica. For the French 
government this was “an unprecedented acceptance of the view that international market 
share was important enough to justify dilution of national control”.118  Over the course of the 
1990s SGS Thomson Microelectronics, later renamed ST Microelectronics, established itself 
as a profitable merchant producer, supplying mainly application-specific integrated circuits 
to European customers such as Bosch in Germany and Alcatel in France. It was floated on the 
stock market in 1994, allowing the French and Italian governments to reduce their stakes.119 
Thomson’s consumer electronics arm, battling against intense Japanese competition, posed 
even more problems. Here, too, the Socialists hoped that, through acquisitions, Thomson 
could achieve the economies of scale that were thought to be necessary to counter Japanese 
domination.120   Several takeovers were made, including Thorn’s Ferguson subsidiary in the 
UK and RCA in the US, but at the end of the 1980s the division was still losing money. In 1991 
the Socialist Prime Minister, Edith Cresson, devised a scheme whereby this business, togeth-
er with Thomson’s stake in SGS-Thomson, would be taken over by the non-nuclear arm of 
CEA, the state-owned nuclear group. The model for this bizarre scheme was Cresson’s desire 
to create a French version of Toshiba, the Japanese conglomerate which included nuclear 
technology as well as TV sets in its portfolio. However, this attempt at what the French called 
“meccano industriel” was not pursued, and the consumer electronics business continued to 
be a drain on Thomson’s finances. 
The 1993 parliamentary elections brought the return of a right-wing government; this was a 
second period of cohabitation that lasted until 1995, when the candidate of the right, Jacques 
Chirac, won the presidential election. The new government announced that it would pri-
vatise twelve industrial companies that had been on the original 1986 list, including Bull, 
Thomson, Pechiney and Rhône-Poulenc. More controversially, it added nine new candidates, 
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including Renault, Aérospatiale, Snecma and the steel group Usinor Sacilor.121  
The inclusion of Renault, which had long been a trade union stronghold, was a shock for 
the left, and regarded as risky by some economists.122 The government argued that Renault’s 
ability to participate in the alliances and acquisitions that were transforming the world mo-
tor industry would be inhibited as long as it remained wholly owned by the state; an earlier 
partnership with Volvo had broken down, mainly because Volvo shareholders did not want 
the Swedish company to become part of a group dominated by the French state. In a con-
cession to the left the government agreed to retain majority control of Renault, at least for a 
period. At the time of privatisation the state held 53 per cent of the shares, reduced two years 
later to 46 per cent. In 1999, when Renault formed an alliance with Nissan, the government 
shareholding came down to below 30 per cent.123 
The Renault/Nissan agreement was an example of the internationalisation strategies which 
leading French companies were pursuing during the 1990s. The break-up of Rhône-Poulenc, 
France’s largest chemical company, was part of the same trend. After privatisation in 1993 
the management chose to focus on pharmaceuticals, and it made several acquisitions in this 
field. In 1997 it announced that its chemical businesses would be hived off as an independ-
ent company, to be called Rhodia, while at the same time the pharmaceutical side would be 
merged with Hoechst in Germany; the enlarged group, Aventis, became one of the biggest 
pharmaceutical companies in Europe.
Not all national champions could become world leaders, and the French governments of the 
1990s were willing to accept that, in some cases, the best solution for a poorly performing 
business might be to sell it to a foreign acquirer. Bull, no longer burdened with a global mis-
sion, was partially privatised in 1996, with some 40 per cent of the shares going to Motorola 
of the US and two Japanese companies, NEC and Dai Nippon Printing. Bull is now principally 
a supplier of IT services.  
The case of Thomson was more problematic. In 1996 the government put the company, 
which by then had two main businesses, defence electronics and consumer electronics, up 
for sale. Two offers were submitted. One was from Alcatel Alsthom, which was prepared to 
buy both businesses, the other from Matra, which was only interested in the defence side. 
Under Matra’s plan, consumer electronics would be sold (at a nominal price) to Daewoo 
of South Korea. There was fierce opposition from employees to the Daewoo deal and the 
sale process was aborted. The government then split Thomson into two, Thomson-CSF and 
Thomson Multimedia (which included consumer electronics) and both were privatised in 
1999; the consumer electronics business was later sold to a Chinese company. This allowed 
Thomson-CSF (renamed Thales in 2000) to do what Alcatel had done in telecommunica-
tions equipment - to build a worldwide business in defence electronics. 124  
The freedom to pursue international strategies was also a factor in the government’s decision 
to introduce private capital into the public utilities. France Telecom (successor to the Direc-
tion Générale des Télécommunications) was partially privatised in 1997, EDF in 2005; both 
have been active acquirers of businesses outside France. In privatising the utilities, however, 
France did not go as far as the UK had done. In the case of EDF, the government retained a 
substantial shareholding, and there was no question of breaking the electricity industry into 
smaller pieces and allowing those pieces to be bought by foreigners, as happened in the UK. 
The government also kept control of Areva (formerly Framatome), the  nuclear engineering 
company. 
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These were infrastructure industries and the companies were seen as too important to be ex-
posed to the threat of takeover. The same applied to aerospace and defence. The government 
retained a stake in EADS, the Franco-German group formed in 2000 by the merger between 
Aérospatiale and the Daimler subsidiary, DASA. It also had a minority shareholding in Thales 
and in Safran, the company formed by the merger between Snecma and Sagem in 2004.125  
Even outside infrastructure and defence the ownership of large industrial companies re-
mained a sensitive issue for the French authorities. When the privatisation programme be-
gan in 1986 the government ensured that a large minority shareholding in the privatised 
companies would be in the hands of a stable group of French shareholders – the noyaux durs. 
This was designed to provide protection against unwelcome takeovers. However, during the 
1990s most members of the noyaux durs sold their shares, and the buyers were often foreign, 
mainly Anglo-American, investors. As the shareholder base became more widely spread, 
these companies became vulnerable to takeover. 
The first to suffer this fate was Pechiney, the aluminium company, which was bought by Al-
can in 2003, an event which caused unease in the government but was not actively opposed. 
In the following year Aventis, the Franco-German pharmaceutical group formed by Rhône-
Poulenc and Hoechst, was the subject of a takeover offer from another French pharmaceuti-
cal company, Sanofi. The Swiss company, Novartis, then indicated that it might make a higher 
bid, prompting the French government to make it clear to all the parties that it would not 
permit control of Aventis to pass into non-French hands.  
A striking example of France’s concern to preserve its national champions was the Alstom 
affair in 2004. As noted earlier, this was the company formed by GEC and CGE and later 
floated on the stock market. In 1999 Alstom bought a gas turbine business from ABB, the 
Swiss-Swedish engineering group. ABB had won a large number of orders for this equip-
ment in the US and elsewhere, but the performance of the gas turbines fell short of what 
had been promised, and it became apparent that there was a serious technical fault. By the 
end of 2001 Alstom was facing financial penalties from some of its US customers, and, with 
other parts of the group also performing poorly, there was uncertainty about whether the 
company could survive. 
The French government observed these events with growing concern.  There was no ques-
tion of allowing the group to go under, yet direct assistance from the state would run into 
opposition from the competition authorities in Brussels. Consideration was briefly given to 
a break-up of the group, but in the summer of 2004 the government reached an agreement 
with the Commission whereby, in return for asset sales and cost reductions, the state would 
participate in the financial restructuring of the group. The government took a minority stake 
in Alstom, with the promise that the stake would be sold not later than 2008.
The Alstom rescue did not imply a general retreat from the more liberal policies which suc-
cessive French governments had pursued since the 1980s. There was no longer an appetite 
for grands projets, and much of the apparatus of state intervention had been dismantled.126 
“Looking across the wealthy democracies”, Jonah Levy has written, “one would be hard 
pressed to find any country that shifted so far from its post-war economic strategy as the 
France of François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac”.127  But there were some aspects of free-
market capitalism - not least the hostile takeover - about which French policy-makers were 
distinctly uneasy. There was also a continuing attachment to idea of the state as the protector 
of the nation’s industrial assets. Nicolas Sarkozy, who as finance minister played a central 
part in the Alstom affair, frequently referred to this episode in his successful presidential 
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campaign in 2007. He presented himself as a stalwart defender of French industry against 
marauders from overseas, and determined to resist de-industrialisation. This was a theme 
that would figure prominently during his presidency.   
   
3.3. GERMANY
In contrast to France and the UK, there were no drastic changes in German economic 
policy in the 1980s, but the economy was slow to recover from the two oil shocks and un-
employment remained high. The growth rate of productivity fell far below what had been 
achieved in the 1960s and early 1970s, raising concerns that institutional rigidities, especially 
in the labour market, were holding back Germany’s adjustment to industrial change. Then 
came unification, a hugely important political event but one that imposed heavy costs on the 
West German economy. After a brief post-unification boom, economic growth slowed down 
again and by 1997 unemployment had risen even further to 4.5m, more than 11 per cent of the 
workforce. There was a widely held view, inside the country and outside, that the German 
economy had become over-regulated, and that the earlier emphasis on competition had been 
weakened by the trend towards protection and subsidy; the “social” element in the social 
market economy had taken precedence over the “market” element.128  
German industry was also poorly equipped to take advantage of the new technologies – espe-
cially information technology and biotechnology – which looked certain to grow faster than 
the mature industries such as automobiles and mechanical engineering that constituted the 
bulk of Germany’s exports. There was an inertia in Germany, some commentators argued, 
which made it difficult to shift financial and human resources from traditional industries 
into high-technology sectors.129  
The Ministry of Research had based its initial support for information technology on estab-
lished companies such as Siemens and AEG, and this continued in the 1980s. In semicon-
ductors, for example, Siemens was the principal recipient of government grants, but it could 
not match the Japanese producers in developing ever smaller and more powerful devices. 
With the German government’s support, Siemens formed a joint venture with Philips of 
the Netherlands to develop the one megabit chip which would store over one million bits 
of information. The partnership was later extended to include the Franco-Italian group, 
SGS-Thomson. The existence of this partnership did not prevent Siemens from negotiating 
a separate licensing agreement on semiconductors with Toshiba and later with IBM. While 
these decisions were criticised in Germany, Siemens believed that international alliances 
with the world’s leading producers were essential if it was to keep its technology up to date.
In computers, the 1980s saw the start of a transformation of the industry stemming from 
the shift from proprietary to open operating systems. Nixdorf was slow to respond to these 
changes and its financial performance deteriorated; it was taken over by Siemens in 1990. 
Siemens, for its part, had achieved some success with its mainframe computers (some of 
them based on Fujitsu technology) and had increased its share of the German market. Fol-
lowing the takeover of Nixdorf, the enlarged group – Siemens Nixdorf Information Systems 
– was the largest European-owned computer manufacturer, but it faced a formidable task 
in integrating two incompatible ranges and in adapting to the rise of the personal computer.
What Germany lacked was the flow of entrepreneurial start-up firms which had been such 
a source of dynamism in the US. Nixdorf had been an exception, and there were a few oth-
ers such as SAP, a software firm set up by ex-IBM engineers in 1972. SAP found a profitable 
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niche in enterprise resource software and eventually became a major international supplier, 
although its growth was slower than that of Microsoft in the US. The initial public offering 
of SAP shares on the German stock market came in 1988, much later in its history than Mi-
crosoft’s debut on NASDAQ in 1985.130  Starting and building this sort of business was harder 
in Germany than in the US because of the absence of supporting institutions, including a 
venture capital industry that was willing to back untried entrepreneurs and a stock market 
that allowed early-stage investors to exit.  
The same obstacles held back the biotechnology industry. This sector had been targeted by 
the BMFT in the 1970s and Federal support for biotechnology research increased sharply 
during the 1980s and 1990s, but German performance remained poor, mainly because of 
the absence of the specialised biotechnology companies which were driving the growth of 
the industry in the US. Direct intervention by the BMFT could not make up for the absence 
of the supportive institutions and policies which were vital to the success of the American 
biotechnology industry.131  
A high-technology industry that did make progress, with the aid of generous state subsidies, 
was aerospace.132  As noted earlier, a group of German aircraft manufacturers had got togeth-
er to form Deutsche Airbus, which became the German partner in the Airbus consortium. 
In 1989 these companies, together with Dornier, were taken over by Daimler-Benz, which at 
that time was trying to reduce its dependence on cars and trucks by diversifying into high-
technology industries. The acquisition was opposed by the Cartel Office on the grounds that 
it would lead to too much concentration of power, but for the Federal government – and 
for the Land governments which were part-owners of several of the companies – it had the 
attraction of putting the German aircraft industry into the hands of a large, well-financed 
company which should, over time, no longer need to be subsidised.
The aircraft industry was a special case, not least because it had strong political support both 
at the Federal and at the Land level. Other high-technology industries were still lagging, 
and there were some calls in Germany for a Japanese-style industrial policy, based on close 
cooperation between government and industry.133  By the mid-1990s, however, the Japanese 
model was out of fashion as the country’s economy entered a prolonged period of stagnation. 
Instead, attention turned to the US. 
In Germany, as in other European countries, policy makers were impressed by the extraor-
dinary success of American companies in exploiting the opportunities created by the inter-
net. It was clear that, if Germany was to catch up with the US in the industries of the “new 
economy”, institutional reforms were necessary, especially in the capital markets. US-style 
entrepreneurial start-ups were unlikely to flourish unless they had access to funds from 
venture capitalists, and the venture capitalists in turn needed to be able to exit their invest-
ments through a stock market flotation. Given the absence in Germany of a shareholding 
culture, German citizens had to be persuaded that buying shares on the stock market was a 
worthwhile investment. 
The government took two steps in the second half of the 1990s to promote greater interest in 
equity. One was the privatisation of Deutsche Telekom in 1996. The other was the establish-
ment in 1997 of the Neuer Markt, a new trading arm within the Frankfurt Stock exchange 
which was specifically designed to attract young firms that needed equity finance. 
The first of these was in part a response to the European Commission moves to liberalise the 
European telecommunications market. Privatisation was “an important step in converting 
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a government-run telephone monopoly into a nimble competitor in the emerging European 
and world telecommunications market”. 134 As a shareholder-owned company Deutsche Tel-
ekom would have greater freedom to acquire, or make alliances with, overseas telecommu-
nications companies. But privatisation of a large, high-profile company was also a means of 
encouraging wider share ownership. The flotation of Deutsche Telekom was the largest-ever 
initial public offering of a European company. Nearly 2m Germans subscribed to the offer, 
including 400,000 who had never previously owned shares.
The Neuer Markt was intended to match some of the features of Nasdaq in the US, with more 
liberal listing rules so as to allow young companies, even if loss-making, to obtain a public 
quotation. The market got off to a slow start – only twelve IPOs took place in 1997 – but the 
momentum increased as a few high-flyers, such as Mobilcom, a mobile telecommunications 
company, attracted investor interest. In 1999, when the boom was at its height, more than 
130 new companies were floated.135        
Other initiatives were taken during this period to improve the environment for high-tech-
nology start-ups. In 1995 the Ministry of Research launched the BioRegio competition, the 
purpose of which was “to encourage local biotech communities to interact more closely, to 
create an entrepreneurial spirit among scientists and to help them in the setting up of their 
own businesses”.136  The aim was to enable Germany’s lagging biotechnology industry to 
overtake its British counterpart and to become the leader in Europe.
One commentator, writing in early 2000, hailed these moves as an example of a new type of 
technology policy. “The unexpected has happened. The federal government has assumed 
a leadership role, and is responsible for the turnaround in biotech and venture capital”.137 
There was certainly a remarkable surge in the creation of new biotechnology companies, but 
the collapse of the stock market boom exposed the frailty of some of these firms, which had 
vastly inflated their profit expectations. Although all stock exchanges were hit by the share 
price collapse, the Neuer Markt suffered most; it was closed at the end of 2002.
A sober review of the German biotechnology industry, written in 2003, noted that the “matu-
ration process of the German biotechnology industry has been abruptly stopped”; most Ger-
man companies lacked the critical mass for sustainability.138  Although some biotechnology 
firms survived the crash and established themselves as viable concerns, the growth of the 
industry during the 2000s has been disappointingly slow, as it has been in other European 
countries.139     
For some German observers the collapse of the Neuer Markt came about because the German 
business system did not lend itself to the kind of high-risk, high-reward form of capitalism 
that flourished in the US. The late 1990s, according to this view, were something of an aber-
ration. “Prior to 1997, Germany was located in a conventional company equilibrium in which 
both investors and employees had a low-risk profile. In the late 1990s there was a significant 
increase in the amount of risk capital. The surge in high-tech IPOs on the Neuer Markt was 
attributable to this brief surge in the availability of risk capital. Since 2001, however, the sup-
ply of risk capital has reverted to levels corresponding more to the norms of the 1980s and 
first part of the 1990s”.140  
Even if this judgement is correct, the rationale that lay behind the flotation of Deutsche 
Telekom and the creation of the Neuer Markt remained valid. The German business system 
needed to move at least some of the way towards the American model and to provide a more 
conducive environment for start-up firms. It was no longer enough to rely on giants such as 
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Siemens, Bayer and Daimler-Benz; some way had to be found of injecting greater entrepre-
neurial vitality into German industry.
Meanwhile some of those giants were becoming increasingly reluctant to devote large sums 
of their own money to high-technology businesses which showed no prospect of earning an 
adequate return. This was in part the consequence of a change in German share ownership. 
During the 1990s, as in the French case discussed earlier, foreign investors, mostly American 
and British financial institutions, became significant shareholders in large German compa-
nies. This coincided with a loosening of ties between companies and their banks, and a par-
tial unwinding of the cross-shareholdings which had effectively insulated companies from 
shareholder pressure.141  Managers found themselves dealing with investors who were pri-
marily interested in shareholder value – a concept that had previously been almost unknown 
in German industry. Anglo-American shareholders were particularly critical of diversified 
groups which were subsidising bad businesses out of profits made in good ones.
Siemens was one such group, and it was attacked by investment analysts for sticking too long 
with loss-making businesses. The company had invested in semiconductors in the belief 
that as a large producer of computers and other electronics-based equipment it would be 
at a competitive disadvantage if it did not have an in-house source of semiconductors. But 
the semiconductor business was not profitable. As an analyst in a British investment bank 
noted in 1991, “by taking on the Japanese head-on in memories the semiconductor division 
has become and remains a painful example of how the Siemens style of running a business 
can leave the group with a burden no competitor would countenance”. 142 This analyst was 
also doubtful about Siemens Nixdorf, the computer business, which had a strong position in 
Germany but little presence elsewhere. Although Siemens continued to invest in both these 
sectors during the 1990s, at the end of the decade it decided to pull back. The semiconductor 
division was divested as a separately quoted company (Infineon) and Siemens Nixdorf was 
put into a joint venture with Fujitsu. 143
The restructuring of Siemens was one of several cases where German companies divested 
poorly performing subsidiaries, and part of the motivation was to make themselves more 
attractive to non-German investors.144  A partial Americanisation of German business was 
under way.145  But the other much-admired feature of the US business system – fast-growing 
entrepreneurial firms in high-technology industries – was still lacking. 
In a report on the German economy published in 2004 the OECD noted that the number of 
new entrants in high technology was relatively low in Germany. “The closure of the Neuer 
Markt stock exchange segment for young technology firms in 2003 was a blow to the ven-
ture capital industry as the Neuer Markt provided about 75 per cent of the initial public 
offerings for VC-backed firms between 1998 and 2000”. Similar points were made in a later 
European Commission study, which argued that Germany’s innovative capacity needed to be 
reinforced. The main weakness, according to this study, was that innovation appeared to be 
concentrated in a relatively small number of large companies and geared towards rationalisa-
tion and cost reduction rather than developing and introducing new products. “Small- and 
medium-sized companies clearly lag behind the industrial leaders and their position has ap-
parently weakened over time. It is they who are most constrained in their access to venture 
capital, especially since the Neuer Markt had been closed”.146  
In response to these concerns the Ministry of Education and Research introduced in 2006 a 
new “high-tech strategy”. Described as “the first national strategy to show how Germany can 
become and remain a global leader in the most important cutting-edge technologies”, it was 
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accompanied by an increase in government support for R & D. The government also set up 
an expert commission on science and innovation to assess Germany’s progress and to make 
recommendations for policy changes. In its first report, published in 2008, the commission 
drew attention to the country’s continuing lag in new technologies.147  “The driving force for 
radically new forms of value creation is provided by new enterprises. However in Germany 
there are no signs of a drive to start up new companies in cutting-edge technologies and 
knowledge-intensive services”. 
3.4. INDUSTRIAL POLICY AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL
The 1980s saw two initiatives at the European level aimed at improving European industrial 
performance. One was what became known as the European Strategic Programme for Re-
search in Information Technologies (ESPRIT). The other was the Single Market Programme, 
an attempt to create an integrated European market by removing the remaining obstacles to 
the cross-border movement of goods, capital and people.    
The starting-point for ESPRIT was the dialogue that began in 1980 between Étienne Davi-
gnon, Commissioner for Industry, and the heads of Europe’s leading computer and telecom-
munications equipment manufacturers.148 Agreement was soon reached on a pilot phase, 
consisting of a range of projects that would be funded jointly by industry and the Commis-
sion; the first call for responses in 1983 prompted applications from two hundred companies, 
including many small- and medium-sized firms. Work then began on a five-year ESPRIT 
programme, to run from 1984 to 1988. The focus was on pre-competitive research, ensuring 
that the participants would not contravene the Community’s rules on competition.  
Part of the rationale for ESPRIT was the belief that collaborative research, bringing together 
companies, universities and research institutes across Europe, would improve the quantity 
and quality of European research and help European industry catch up with its Japanese and 
American competitors. “European policy makers had allowed themselves to become con-
vinced that the Japanese had become so successful in microelectronics because the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry (MITI) had engineered the coordination of government, 
industry and universities to be innovative in microelectronics. Indeed when ESPRIT was 
launched the Commission had grand ambitions to be the European MITI”.149  
The immediate spur for ESPRIT, as it was for Alvey in the UK, was Japan’s Fifth Generation 
Computer programme, announced by MITI in 1981 and aimed at enabling Japanese compu-
ter manufacturers to overtake IBM in the next generation of computer technology.150 The 
contribution of collaborative research to Japanese competitiveness was almost certainly ex-
aggerated151, but in the early 1980s Japan was riding high and Japanese electronics companies 
looked set to dominate the world market.     
ESPRIT was followed by other collaborative programmes, including RACE (Research into 
Advanced Communications for Europe) and BRITE (Basic Research in Industrial Technolo-
gies for Europe152), and all these activities were brought together in what was called the 
Framework Programme. The first Framework Programme ran from 1984 to 1987, and it has 
continued to be the European Commission’s principal instrument for channelling funds into 
collaborative research.153  
A further step towards cooperation came in 1985 when President Mitterrand of France pro-
posed the creation of a European Research Coordinating Agency, later known as Eureka. 
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The trigger was the announcement by President Reagan of the Strategic Defence Initiative, 
an ambitious plan to create a defensive shield against incoming missiles. While many in 
Europe doubted the technical feasibility of the so-called Star Wars programme, it was rec-
ognised that SDI would fund vast amounts of research in technologies that had commercial 
applications.154 Whatever the outcome of SDI in terms of defence, the programme was likely 
to strengthen America’s high-technology industries and make it even harder for European 
companies to catch up.
Eureka was a French initiative, and the initial reaction in the UK and Germany was scep-
tical. But industrialists in these countries recognised that Eureka, an inter-governmental 
programme outside the control of the European Commission, might have some advantages; 
companies could decide whether or not to take part as they wished, and Eureka might use-
fully supplement national R & D programmes. Eureka projects would also be nearer the 
market than the pre-competitive research supported by the European Commission. By 1989 
nearly 300 Eureka projects were under way, of which about a quarter related to information 
technology and another 20 per cent to biotechnology and medical technologies. Two of the 
biggest programmes were the HDTV scheme, designed to establish a European standard 
for high-definition broadcasting, and JESSI (Joint European Submicron Silicon Initiative) 
aimed at supporting the development of advanced semiconductors.
As these programmes were taking shape, another initiative, with greater importance for 
the future of Europe, was under way. Despite the lowering of tariffs that had followed the 
creation of the Common Market in 1958, there were still numerous non-tariff barriers that 
prevented companies from competing on a trans-European basis. The removal of these bar-
riers, and the promotion of open competition in sectors which had previously been protected 
by governments, were seen as essential steps towards re-energising European industry. This 
was in line with the reforms that were being undertaken by the Thatcher government, and 
the UK provided much of the impetus that led to the Single European Act in 1986. That Act, 
the most important step towards European economic integration since the Treaty of Rome, 
has been described as “Mrs Thatcher’s baby”.155 It contained nearly 300 specific measures 
covering such areas as preferential public procurement and the provision of state aids, with 
the overriding objective of allowing markets to work more freely.  
The architects of the Act believed that it would produce “a dramatically new environment” 
for consumers and producers alike.156 The gains would come in four main areas: reductions 
in costs thanks to economies of scale; improved efficiency within companies, with prices 
moving downward toward production costs under the pressure of more competition; the 
reallocation of resources among European countries in response to differences in compara-
tive advantage; and more innovation, generated by the dynamics of the internal market.      
These ambitions were only partially fulfilled. Competitive pressure certainly increased, and 
several companies sought to break out of what were no longer safe domestic havens by merg-
ing with or acquiring firms in other parts of Europe. Tighter rules on subsidies prevented 
governments from cosseting their national champions. In public utility industries such as 
telecommunications, the Commission forced governments to open up their markets to new 
entrants and to establish independent regulators charged with ensuring that the former 
incumbents did not abuse their market power; most European governments, following the 
lead set by the UK, privatised their telecommunications operators during the 1990s. 
One of the biggest successes for the single market programme came in mobile telephony. 
When mobile telephones were first introduced, using analogue technology, the European 
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market was fragmented by incompatible national standards. For the next generation of tel-
ephones, based on digital technology, the European Commission secured the agreement of 
member states to establish a Europe-wide standard, known as GSM, which allowed net-
work providers and manufacturers of equipment to compete on a European basis. “The GSM 
standard put in place a standard for a market – a market that was large enough for leading 
continental players to achieve the scale necessary to compete globally. Thus, public policy 
was not protectionism in disguise but rather ‘market-creating’ in the sense that it established 
a large enough single market to enable European (as it turned out the winners were Scandi-
navian, but this was not pre-ordained) to reach scale and be competitive in global markets”.157 
The success of GSM showed that the creation of a barrier-free internal market could boost 
the competitiveness of European industry and provide consumers with better products and 
services.158  
Yet the impact of the 1992 programme was not as extensive as its proponents had hoped.159 
Although the number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions increased, the structure of 
European industry in the mid-1990s was not very different from what it had been ten years 
earlier. As a later study by the European Commission remarked, “in the wake of the Single 
European Market the extent of structural change appears to have been somewhat disap-
pointingly slow”.160  There was disappointment, too, over the results of technological col-
laboration. Although the ESPRIT programmes continued to be supported by governments 
and companies, they were not translated into greater commercial success. This was also true 
of Eureka. The biggest of the Eureka programmes, which was also supported by the Commis-
sion, was the HDTV project. Pushed by TV set manufacturers such as Philips and Thomson, 
the plan was to establish a European standard (known as MAC) for satellite broadcasting 
and thus to prevent the imposition of a Japanese standard that would make existing TV sets 
obsolete. But the project was dogged by disagreements between broadcasters and TV set 
manufacturers. By the early 1990s the MAC standard was effectively made redundant by 
technological advances in the US, leading to the adoption of a fully digital broadcasting sys-
tem.161 The JESSI semiconductor project, which ran from 1989 to 1996, was more successful, 
although two of the three principal participants, Siemens and Philips, later pulled out of the 
semiconductor business.162  
Inter-company collaboration on the Japanese model, it seemed, whether in pre-competitive 
research or closer to the market, could not do much to upgrade Europe’s position in high-
technology industries. By the early 1990s targeted industrial policy of the sort that had been 
practised in Japan was out of fashion. In a paper published in 1992 the Commission set out an 
approach that was almost Thatcherite in tone. “In the 1970s industrial policy was character-
ised by a dirigiste and sectoral approach. Today it is recognised that public interventions in 
this area must take the form of horizontal activities to achieve the right climate and balance 
for maximising the productivity and competitiveness of European industry”.163  
In this context the appropriate model was no longer Japan but the US. As noted in earlier sec-
tions, American leadership in the “new economy” prompted European governments to look 
for ways of reshaping their institutions along American lines. The aim of the Lisbon agenda, 
adopted by member states in 2000, was to make the European Union “the most competi-
tive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic 
growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”. This was to be achieved 
by action on several fronts: boosting innovation and investment in R & D; faster structural 
reform by completing the internal market, especially in services; making the labour market 
more flexible, with the goal of achieving a 70 per cent employment rate (compared to the 
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current figure of 63 per cent); and sound macroeconomic policies. 
The success of the Lisbon programme hinged on the response from national governments, 
but  the commitment of member states turned out to be less than wholehearted. In 2002 a 
high-level group of economists set up by the Commission and led by André Sapir reported 
that “substantive outcomes (from the Lisbon process) are so far meagre”. The main recom-
mendation of the Sapir report was that that the European Union needed to go faster and 
further in liberalising the economy. “What is needed now is less vertically integrated firms, 
greater mobility within and across firms, more retraining, greater flexibility of labour mar-
kets, greater availability of external finance, especially equity finance, and higher investment 
in both R & D and higher education. In other words, what is required is a massive change 
in economic institutions and organisations, which has not yet occurred on a large scale in 
Europe.”164 
A later review for the Commission, chaired by Wim Kok, concluded that the failure of Lisbon 
was due to an overloaded agenda, poor coordination, conflicting priorities and, above all, the 
lack of determined political action.165 Europe’s problem, according to the Kok report, was 
partly due to a slowdown in the rate of technological progress, especially in information and 
communications technologies; there was insufficient investment in R & D and “an indiffer-
ent capacity to transform research into marketable products and processes”. The Kok report 
was followed by a relaunch of the Lisbon strategy. The number of priority areas was reduced 
and the division of responsibilities between the Commission and national governments was 
made clearer.  
Despite these changes there was little evidence in the years leading up to the financial crisis 
that the reforms set out in the Sapir and Kok reports were being carried through. In par-
ticular, the failure to implement the Commission’s services directive, which had been seen 
as a cornerstone of the Lisbon strategy, reflected the lukewarm attitude on the part of some 
member states towards genuine Europe-wide competition.  
   
3.5. EUROPEAN INDUSTRY BEFORE THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
The shift away from government intervention in the 1980s and 1990s, together with the in-
crease in competitive pressure arising from more open markets and more demanding inves-
tors, improved the efficiency of European industry and to some extent corrected the errors 
caused by ill-judged industrial policies in the 1960s and 1970s. But there were two grounds 
for concern. The first was the widening productivity gap between the US and Europe which 
had first become evident in the mid-1990s; after rising to 94 per cent of the US level in 1995, 
GDP per hour worked in Europe fell back to 85 per cent in 2003.166 The second was the ac-
celerating transfer of manufacturing capacity, not just in labour-intensive sectors but also 
in electronics and other high-technology industries, to China and other emerging markets. 
In Europe, as in other advanced countries, the decline of manufacturing as a proportion of 
GDP had been under way for some years, but the assumption had been that these countries 
would retain a sizeable manufacturing sector, concentrating on high-value-added, knowl-
edge-intensive goods which China would be unable to match. With China investing heavily 
in research and moving up the value chain, that assumption was looking more questionable. 
The two issues were related since Europe’s lag in productivity was partly due to its failure 
to keep pace with the US in the production and use of information technology, and that in 
turn was linked to Europe’s over-dependence on older industries. Europe’s industrial struc-
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ture, it seemed, was not only holding back productivity growth, but also making it difficult 
for Europe to adapt to the changing international division of labour. The fact that so much 
of Europe’s trade was concentrated in sectors with medium-high technologies and low-to-
intermediate labour skills exposed European countries to competition from producers in 
emerging countries that were upgrading the skill intensity of their exports. “Adaptability and 
structural change, allowing a more robust situation of comparative advantage, are critically 
needed if the EU is to maximise the gains from the integration of China, India and other fast 
growing economies into the world economy”.167   
These were the considerations which, before the financial crisis, were prompting some Eu-
ropean governments and the European Commission to undertake a reappraisal of industrial 
policy. Was it enough to rely on the market to generate the structural changes that were 
needed, or should governments be more active in steering European companies into indus-
tries that were likely to be both high-growth and defensible against low-wage competition? 
     
4. THE CRISIS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: A REVIVAL OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY? 
The severe recession that followed the banking crisis prompted government intervention 
on an unprecedented scale. Some of the most spectacular moves came, surprisingly, from the 
US. In a decision reminiscent of the rescue of British Leyland in the mid-1970s, the Obama 
Administration provided financial support to two of the country’s largest car manufacturers, 
General Motors and Chrysler, in order to prevent their collapse.168 As with British Leyland, 
General Motors’ problems were largely self-inflicted – it had been losing ground to Japanese 
and other foreign manufacturers for many years – but the Obama administration was pre-
pared to override the market in order to preserve an American-owned company because of 
its importance as an employer. 
Employment had also been falling in other parts of the manufacturing sector, not because 
of mismanagement, but because American companies were moving part of their production 
to countries where labour costs were lower. Offshoring was not a new phenomenon – in 
labour-intensive industries such as textiles and clothing it had begun many years earlier – 
but it was spreading to industries such as electronics and affecting the higher-value parts of 
the production chain. Two economists, Gary Pisano and Willy Shih, writing in the Harvard 
Business Review, pointed out that outsourcing in electronics had not stopped with low-value 
tasks like simple assembly or circuit-board stuffing, but had also affected “sophisticated en-
gineering and manufacturing capabilities in a wide range of products”, such as light-emitting 
diodes, batteries for electric cars and flat panel displays for TVs, computers and hand-held 
devices.169 They urged the government to reverse the slide in the funding of basic and ap-
plied science and to focus resources on “grand challenge problems” such as climate change 
where collaboration between the public sector, companies and universities could create new 
industrial opportunities. 
This article provoked a lengthy debate in which some economists argued that Pisano and 
Shih were too pessimistic. David Yoffie, an influential writer on technology, suggested that 
the loss of manufacturing capacity in a high-cost country like the US was inevitable and 
should not be a cause for concern. “The future of US competitiveness in high-tech indus-
tries such as computers, software, communications and electronics may depend more on the 
transition to services than trying to retain the country’s manufacturing base”. Yet the Pisano-
Shih line was supported by several business leaders, including Andrew Grove, former head 
of Intel, and Andrew Liveris, chief executive of Dow Chemical Company.170  
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The same theme was taken up by Michael Spence, a Nobel prize-winning economist. Spence 
argued that persistently high unemployment in the US was due in part to the disappear-
ance of manufacturing jobs and that this trend must be reversed.171 There was not enough 
incentive for US companies to invest in techniques that enhanced labour productivity in the 
tradable sectors of the economy. This was not a market failure in the conventional economic 
sense, Spencer suggested, but it had to be countered by new investment in advanced tech-
nologies with public support.
Among European countries France is the one where the deindustrialisation debate has been 
running most strongly.172 During his second term as President of the Republic, Jacques Chirac 
invited Jean-Louis Beffa, the head of St Gobain, to make proposals for a new industrial policy 
which would ensure that France did not fall behind in the industries of the future. Beffa 
was asked to examine in which sectors and by what methods France could set in train “une 
relance ambitieuse des grands programmes scientifiques et technologiques” - an echo of the 
grands projets of the past. In his report Beffa called for “mobilising programmes” targeted at 
large risky projects which needed a state contribution for their financing.173  These projects 
would be run by a new agency, Agence de l’innovation industrielle (AII), and would be fo-
cused on five main areas: energy, transport, environment, health and information technology. 
The new agency was set up in 2005 with a budget of €2bn, and over the next two years some 
twenty projects were started, most of them jointly financed with French or European com-
panies. One of the first was Quaero, an attempt to create a search engine that would compete 
with Google in the US. Thomson and France Telecom were the prime movers in this venture, 
in which German companies also agreed to participate, but it made little progress and the 
Germans subsequently withdrew. AII was subsequently closed down, after Chirac had left 
office, and its functions transferred to another government agency, OSEO, which had a wider 
responsibility for supporting innovation in small- and medium-sized firms.174   
Another French initiative during the Chirac presidency was the creation of pôles de compéti-
tivité, or competitiveness clusters, loosely based on the Silicon Valley model. The idea was 
to bring together in a particular region firms, research centres and training and education 
facilities belonging to the same industrial sector, and to encourage them to work together 
on innovative projects. Some 67 clusters were selected, covering a variety of fields including 
low-technology industries as well as advanced sectors such as nanotechnology and biotech-
nology. This programme has been criticised on the grounds that the number of clusters was 
too large, and that public sector officials were ill equipped to identify the sectors and regions 
that deserved support.175  
When Nicolas Sarkozy took over the presidency in 2007, he had already established a repu-
tation as a defender of French industry. His immediate task when the financial crisis hit 
was to rescue the banks, and this was followed by the provision of low-interest loans to the 
French car manufacturers to prevent plant closures, together with an incentive scheme to 
encourage car buyers to replace old models with newer, fuel-efficient vehicles. Sarkozy was 
also concerned to prevent French companies which had been weakened by the recession 
from being snapped up by foreign predators. “I will not be the French President”, he said in 
2008, “who wakes up in six months’ time to see that French industrial groups have passed 
into other hands”.176 
In 2008 President Sarkozy announced the establishment of a Strategic Investment Fund, 
with a remit to take minority stakes in French companies with high growth potential which 
needed additional capital. In its first full year of operation the fund made investments total-
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ling €1.2bn in twenty-one companies, including Meccano, the toy manufacturer, and Daily 
Motion, an internet start-up. Critics of the fund were relieved that the fund was not used 
to rescue “lame ducks”. Its operations were for the most part similar to those of a private 
equity group, but with a strong orientation towards preserving French ownership; in at least 
one case, when one of the companies in which it had invested was put up for sale, the Fund 
used its votes to ensure that the buyer was French, despite higher offers from non-French 
companies.177   
As Sarkozy explained in a later speech, he was determined to use the power of the state 
to resist de-industrialisation and to strengthen France’s position in key industries, just as 
his predecessors had done. Where the government was a shareholder in an industrial en-
terprise such as Renault, it should use its influence to ensure that the company’s strategic 
decisions were in the best interests of the country; it was not acceptable, Sarkozy said, that 
the privately-owned Peugeot had two thirds of its worldwide employees in France, while 
Renault had only one third. 
How far Sarkozy could go in the direction of interventionist policies was constrained both by 
budgetary pressures and by European Union rules on state aids; there was no question of re-
verting to old-style French dirigisme.178 Nevertheless, his activism helped to spark a renewed 
interest in industrial policy in other European countries, not least the UK 
Some British business leaders were increasingly unhappy with the laissez-faire approach 
towards industrial policy which had been followed by successive governments. In a widely 
noted speech Sir John Rose, chief executive of Rolls-Royce, the aero-engine manufacturer, 
deplored the loss of expertise in such industries as railways, power generation and nuclear 
power, comparing the continued success of French and German companies like Siemens 
and Areva with the virtual disappearance of their British counterparts. He urged the govern-
ment to develop a clearer sense of direction for industry. “We need”, he said, “a framework, 
or a business route map, to create context, drive focus and help prioritise public and private 
sector investment. Unfortunately the fear of returning to anything that remotely resembles 
centralised industrial planning has resulted in even the discussion of such a framework be-
ing off limits”.179     
Sir John’s remarks appeared to have little impact on government policy; Labour was sticking 
to the non-interventionist stance which it had inherited from Margaret Thatcher. Towards 
the end of the government’s term, however, there were signs of a change in thinking. Peter 
Mandelson, who was brought back to the government in 2008 as Business Secretary, believed 
that the UK had allowed itself to become too dependent on financial services. Drawing on 
advice from Rose and other industrialists, he looked for ways of rebalancing the economy, 
but not by means of old-style intervention. Government needed to help in those areas where 
businesses “would not or could not take the lead because market signals or incentives were 
not strong enough”.180 In several speeches and interviews he referred admiringly to the 
French government’s industrial policy, suggesting that the UK could learn from the way the 
French government took care of high-technology companies.181  This was warmly welcomed 
by the Trades Union Congress, which argued that what Sarkozy was doing through the Stra-
tegic Investment Fund should be imitated in the UK.182   
In a White Paper published in 2009, Mandelson called for a “new activism” on the part of 
government to help business exploit the opportunities that were becoming available, espe-
cially in advanced technologies.183  The government should be willing to consider “targeted 
intervention” where clear gains could be achieved. In a review of policy published shortly 
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before the 2010 election, the government reported several examples of sectoral interven-
tion, some of which were directed at individual companies (for example, a grant to Nissan 
to support a new battery plant and the manufacture of a new electric car) while others were 
concerned with advanced technologies, including composite materials, plastic electronics 
and industrial biotechnology.184   
When the Conservative-Liberal coalition government was formed after the 2010 election 
some of these grants were withdrawn. The new Business Secretary, Vince Cable, said he had 
no intention of “trying to micro-manage the economy at the level of individual companies 
or so-called national champions”.185  On the other hand, he shared Peter Mandelson’s view 
that the manufacturing sector had declined too far and needed to be revived. “Supporting the 
industries of the future”, he said in a later speech, “requires addressing some of the market 
failures involved”. One such failure was in the innovation phase of new technologies, hence 
the decision to establish a network of Technology Innovation Centres, loosely based on the 
Fraunhofer model in Germany. The government also set up a Regional Growth Fund to pro-
vide limited amounts of seed capital as a catalyst for new investment by the private sector, 
especially in areas of the country where there had been a historic reliance on the public 
sector for jobs. With these and other supportive policies in place, Cable was confident “that 
world-class manufacturing will once again be at the heart of our economy”.186       
Least affected by worries about de-industrialisation was Germany. Thanks in part to labour 
market reforms and cuts in welfare expenditure carried out between 2003 and 2007, it had 
come through the financial crisis in relatively good shape. Germany also benefited to a great-
er extent than the UK or France from the booming demand in China for the capital equip-
ment and other industrial goods in which German industry was especially strong. There was 
some anxiety in Germany about the continuing failure to match the US in high-technology 
industries, but no major new initiatives seemed likely beyond the strategy set out by the 
Ministry of Research and Education in 2006, subsequently revised and relabelled as the 
High-Tech Strategy 2020.       
As for the European Commission, the relaunch of the Lisbon agenda in 2005 was followed 
by several initiatives aimed at encouraging European industry to exploit new technological 
opportunities. Although the Commission supported some expensive projects such as Galileo, 
the satellite navigation programme, and Iter, the nuclear fusion reactor, much of its activity 
was devoted to improving the environment for entrepreneurial firms in high-technology 
industries. Two particular areas of attention was the absence of a unitary patent in Europe, 
which increased the cost of protecting intellectual property compared to the US, and public 
procurement. 
The Commission continued to support collaborative research, launching a series of Joint 
Technology Initiatives in such fields as innovative medicines, computing systems (the Ar-
temis project) and nanoelectronics; all these were joint ventures between the Commission 
and the relevant industrial sector. The Commission also launched a “lead market” initiative, 
identifying markets which had high growth potential and in which European companies 
were well placed to compete. The first six were eHealth, protective textiles, sustainable con-
struction, recycling, bio-based products and renewable energy.187  
Some of these programmes were brought together in a revised version of the Lisbon strategy 
which was launched in 2010. Known as Europe 2020, it was made up of several “flagship ini-
tiatives”, one of which was “an integrated industrial policy for the globalisation era”. As with 
the Lisbon agenda, the main goal was to improve the framework conditions for European 
45
ECIPE OCCASIONAL PAPER
No. 1/2012
business in a way that would be more conducive to innovation. But it was recognised that 
general policies – for example, in the area of standardisation or patents – affected different 
sectors in different ways, and that industrial policy was more likely to be effective if it took 
account of these sectoral differences. This has been described as the matrix approach, based 
on an understanding “that the effects of broad horizontal measures can vary significantly 
from industry to industry, that competitiveness needs specific policy mixes for specific sec-
tors, and that some sectors may require complementary measures that are not necessary or 
relevant in other sectors”.188                                                                                                                                                        
Whether Europe 2020 will be more successful than Lisbon will depend much more on deci-
sions taken in member states than on the activities of the Commission itself. As things stood 
at the end of 2011, when this paper was written, European governments were too preoc-
cupied with the future of the euro and the weakness of the financial sector to devote much 
attention to industrial policy. But the issue of industrial competitiveness, and what govern-
ments could do to enhance it, remained a matter of pressing concern, both in Brussels and 
in national capitals.  
5. CONCLUSION
The events described in this paper throw up some clear lessons about what governments 
should not do in the field of industrial policy. What they should do is a more difficult ques-
tion to answer.
Most of the errors relate to the first phase, between the 1950s and 1980s, although some of 
them were still being committed in the second. They stemmed from an exaggerated belief in 
the ability of governments to identify and correct market failures, and the consequent ten-
dency to substitute the judgement of politicians and bureaucrats for that of entrepreneurs 
and business managers. There was also a failure to recognise that medium-sized European 
nations could not realistically expect to compete in all major industries and technologies. 
Attempts to create competitive advantage through government direction and support were 
generally unsuccessful, while intervention in distressed industries, to arrest the decline or 
to make it less painful for employees, served little purpose other than to delay the shift of 
resources to more viable sectors.
Of the three large European countries discussed in this paper, the UK made the worst mis-
takes during the first phase, and suffered accordingly. The best performing economy was 
that of West Germany, where the use of interventionist policies was too limited to cause 
much damage. France’s experience was mixed, with expensive failures such as the Plan 
Calcul offset by some successes as in nuclear power and telecommunications. A weakness in 
French policy was the preoccupation with national champions, which created some strong 
companies but had a distorting effect on the allocation of resources.  
The second phase, from the 1980s to the early 2000s, saw a shift away from selective in-
tervention towards horizontal policies. The creation of a more open and more competitive 
European market, with stricter prohibitions on the ability of governments to protect and 
support their national companies, put pressure on firms to raise their productivity and to 
concentrate on businesses where they could earn an adequate return. The restructuring of 
European industry was also influenced by fiercer international competition, and by changes 
in the capital markets - more demanding investors, more hostile takeovers and more focus 
on shareholder value.
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The drive for a more integrated market has undoubtedly improved Europe’s economic per-
formance. According to European Commission estimates, the first two decades of reform 
generated a permanent rise of about 2 per cent in the level of EU GDP and boosted employ-
ment by just under 1.5 per cent. But, as the OECD noted in 2009, these benefits were less than 
half of what could be achieved if the single market was to be completed more fully.189 This 
applies particularly to services, where the barriers to intra-European competition remain 
unnecessarily high. It is paradoxical, as a recent report from the European Commission has 
pointed out, that the principal beneficiaries of the single market programme have been man-
ufacturing companies even though the manufacturing sector accounts for an ever smaller 
share of the European economy. Providers of services, by contrast, continue to be hampered 
by national restrictions. “For instance, the innovative small digital-services companies can-
not access the single market and therefore have great difficulties in growing. They usually 
introduce their innovations in their national market first and then move to the US because 
the cost of accessing the US market is no more than the cost of accessing other national mar-
kets in Europe. This is creating large costs for Europe.”190   
As David Encaoua among others has argued, part of the reason for Europe’s productivity lag 
vis-à-vis the US, and for the technology gap, is that the creative destruction process – the 
replacement of old firms by new ones, and the shift of resources from slow-growing to fast-
growing sectors – is slower in Europe than in the US.191  In high-technology industries, in 
particular, the US has a larger number of innovative small- and medium-sized enterprises, 
some of which grow to challenge and displace the incumbents. The solution, in Encaoua’s 
view, lies not only in a more vigorous competition policy but also in a range of other supply-
side measures including labour market reform and a strengthening of the higher education 
system. 
Selective industrial policy is not part of that reform agenda. Others take a different view, 
arguing that, in the face of competition from China and other emerging economies, sector-
based policies can play a role in strengthening European industry. In a recent paper three 
European economists call for an end to the “laissez-faire complacency” which, in their view, 
has led several countries to allow the uncontrolled development of non-tradable sectors, 
especially property, at the expense of tradable sectors.192 European authorities, they believe, 
have underestimated the danger of a specialisation whereby the most advanced countries 
concentrate on upstream R & D and services, while outsourcing everything else to emerg-
ing economies. The concept of sectoral industrial policy should be revisited, but without 
repeating the mistakes of the past. Sectoral aid should not seek to create European champi-
ons but should be allocated evenly within the targeted sector, rather than to one or several 
pre-selected firms.
How should the sectors be chosen? This question is at the heart of the industrial policy de-
bate. Ha-Joon Chang, drawing on the experience of Japan and other East Asian countries, 
emphasises the need for target industries to be selected “realistically”, in the light of each 
country’s technological capabilities and world market conditions; the success of East Asian 
countries such as South Korea owes a lot, in his view, to the fact they did not try to make 
too big a leap.193 These economies were in a catch-up stage and thus in a different situation 
from the advanced countries of Western Europe. But Chang believes that even in a frontier 
economy there are industries that firms do not enter because of high entry costs, and gov-
ernment support can play a critical role. He instances the Airbus as an example of what a 
well-executed industrial policy can achieve.
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Many people in Europe, especially in France, would like to see the Airbus model replicated 
in other industries194  When the A380, the super-jumbo airliner, was unveiled in Toulouse in 
2005, President Chirac hailed the Airbus as a triumph for European industrial policy. “Let 
us pursue the success of Airbus on other fields” he said. “Let us achieve the same outcome 
for the energy of the future, for tomorrow’s transport and telecommunications, for the medi-
cines of the future. Let us do it together, with a truly European ambition”.195  
No one could dispute that the Airbus project is a remarkable demonstration of European 
industry’s ability to match the US in an exceptionally demanding sector. Yet it has been im-
mensely costly to the European taxpayer, and the gains to consumers have probably been 
quite modest.196 Moreover, as Paul Seabright has pointed out, the economic and technical 
characteristics of the aircraft industry make the Airbus a special case.197  Fixed costs of pro-
duction are very high, as are economies of scale; variable costs fall sharply as the volume 
of production increases. Unlike some other high-technology industries such as computers, 
customer requirements are relatively easy to define, and relatively stable. As Seabright notes, 
“designing new aircraft is largely a matter of throwing money at the challenge of carrying a 
given number of passengers for a given distance at reasonable speed and safety and minimum 
fuel cost. Paradoxically, this is one of those industries where an open cheque-book....may 
actually be a recipe for success.” 
Another European industry from which more useful lessons can be learned is mobile te-
lephony. As noted earlier in this paper, the creation of the GSM standard created a Europe-
wide market in mobile communications and generated substantial benefits for consumers 
in the form of better quality and lower prices. One of the winners from that process was the 
Finnish company, Nokia; until its recent troubles Nokia has been regarded as one of Europe’s 
few successes in high technology. Yet, as Christopher Palmberg and Pekka Ylä-Anttila have 
explained, the rise of Nokia was not the result of a government master-plan, or of “picking 
winners”. What the Finnish government sought to do during the 1990s was to create an en-
vironment which would encourage investment in knowledge-based industries, especially 
those linked to information and communications technology. The government focused on 
education, R & D and innovation with the overall aim of making Finland an attractive loca-
tion for internationally competitive firms. This involved an increase in public spending on 
R & D and an enhanced role for the National Technology Agency (an arm of the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry) in setting up technology programmes in government laboratories and 
in industry; the agency also promoted partnerships between public research institutes and 
the private sector. 
An important lesson is that policies towards industry must be consistent over the long term 
and not dictated by short-term cyclical or political considerations. As Palmberg and Ylä-
Anttila conclude, “it is our overall judgement that the Finnish policies were able to find a 
proper balance between activism and non-interference. The role of government was to act 
strongly enough where the market was not working, i.e. in R & D and education, and to cre-
ate and communicate a common vision of future national strengths without intervening too 
much in the functioning of markets”. 
A consequence of the Finnish government’s policies, as these two authors acknowledge, is 
that Finland may have become too dependent on the ICT sector and on Nokia in particular. 
“The central policy challenge today is to find an appropriate balance between a strong focus 
on ICT on the one hand and a diversified industrial base on the other”. Nokia itself has been 
struggling in recent months to adapt to unexpected changes in its market; its slow reaction 
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to the threat posed by “smartphones” from Apple and other suppliers led to a sharp fall in 
the company’s share price and raised questions about its future.        
The wider question that arises from the Finnish case is how far governments can steer their 
national industries towards particular technologies and what instruments of policy are avail-
able for them to do so. Some writers believe that the state can and should play an entre-
preneurial role. Mariana Mazzucato uses US experience to support her argument that the 
government, far from stifling innovation and being a weight on the system, has “fostered 
innovation and dynamism in many industries, with the private sector often taking a back 
seat”.198  She points to the contribution made by the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) to the development of the US computer and semiconductor industries. A 
similar role, she thinks, could be played by the Technology Strategy Board in the UK if it was 
given sufficient resources.199    
It is true that US success in some high-technology industries stems in part from investments 
made by the Federal government. But many of these investments were aimed at military 
rather than commercial objectives, and the subsequent success of US companies in non-
military markets was not the direct consequence of government support. In semiconductors, 
for example, the Department of Defense provided an early market for American firms and 
gave them R & D contracts to develop designs for military applications, but “the major tech-
nological achievements of the 1950s were in most cases accomplished by companies using 
their own funds and following avenues very different from those the DoD was following”.200 
In computers the persistence of US leadership, long after military orders had ceased to be 
significant, was due to other aspects of the American environment, including a venture capi-
tal industry which supported a constant flow of new entrants. In the case of biotechnology, 
government support for biomedical research through the National Institutes of Health is 
only one (very important) ingredient in a set of policies and institutions which have included 
many different agents such as research universities, venture capital firms, patenting offices 
and regulatory agencies.201   
In drawing conclusions from their study of industrial leadership in seven industries David 
Mowery and Richard Nelson emphasise the uncertainties involved in the evolution of new 
technologies. The winners and losers are extraordinarily difficult to predict, so that govern-
ment policies that involve placing large bets on particular paths of development or particular 
firms are likely to fail. One exception, they suggest, is when public policies are used to catch 
up with a clear leader whose characteristics can be evaluated and targeted. Even there, as 
shown by the Japanese experience in mainframe computers, the leader that provided such 
a clear target may have been surpassed by another technology by the time the follower has 
caught up. “If the objective is to achieve or maintain leadership the only reasonable way to 
accomplish it is to encourage pluralism and competition”.
The US economy has benefited from government support for basic research and from ef-
fective arrangements for the diffusion of technology from publicly financed research into 
industry. But the dynamism of America’s high-technology industries is underpinned by other 
institutions and policies, including a stringent antitrust policy and a financial system that 
facilitates new entry. The fact that most of the world’s leading internet firms are based in the 
US is partly due to the earlier development of the relevant technologies within the Depart-
ment of Defense, but, as Shane Greenstein has written, the commercial era of the internet 
played to the strength of US-style market-based innovation. “Once released to commercial 
interests, the internet became the springboard for a dizzying area of applications that were 
not envisioned by the sponsoring government agencies”. 202
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A feature of the US innovation system is that the supportive institutions have for the most 
part remained in place over a long period. In analysing the sources of US success in pharma-
ceuticals and biotechnology Iain Cockburn and Scott Stern point out that the returns to life 
sciences investments by both private and public entities have taken decades to pay off and 
are only now coming to occupy a central role in the delivery of new therapeutics. “These pay-
offs reflect the slow-and-steady evolution of a complex set of institutions and technologies, 
supported by sustained and relatively stable public investments”.203          
Industrial policy cannot be a “quick fix” for short-term economic or political problems. As 
decisions taken during and after the recent financial crisis have shown, governments come 
under pressure during recessions to protect employment in failing companies, and to bend 
the rules on public procurement in order to favour national suppliers. At the European level 
there are some indications that the rules on state aid for industrial restructuring are being 
applied more flexibly in order to give member states more freedom of action. Although there 
is no sign of a general retreat into Fortress Europe, some of the new financial regulations ap-
pear to discriminate against non-European firms. There is also some concern about the Com-
mission’s proposals for a new policy on public procurement, which include the suggestion 
that access to EU markets will be made more difficult for countries that do not themselves 
have reciprocal open tendering systems.204 At the national level the recent controversy in the 
UK over the closure of the Bombardier train-making factory in Derby – attributed by some 
critics to an over-rigid application by the British government of the European Union rules 
on public procurement – reflects a resurgence in protectionist sentiment as the economic 
crisis persists.     
The principal lesson from the events described in this paper are that industrial policy should 
be horizontal rather than sectoral, and embedded in a broader set of institutions and poli-
cies which promote competition, encourage innovation and facilitate industrial change. The 
ability of governments to steer the process of change in a way that favours their national 
companies is limited, and intervention of this kind can have damaging consequences. In the 
drive to create a more innovative Europe, public policy has a role to play but governments 
should be wary about trying to predict which particular technologies are more “promising”, 
and more worthy of support, than others. If industrial policy is used to channel resources 
into favoured sectors and away from less favoured ones, politicians and bureaucrats will be 
assuming a degree of foresight which they do not possess, and taking on a task which they 
are ill-suited to perform. 
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